

A black and white photograph of a woman in profile, facing left. She has short, wavy hair and is wearing a dark, patterned dress with a large white fur collar. She is also wearing a long, multi-strand pearl necklace. The background is dark and out of focus.

THE FUTURE OF HISTORY

2013-2014 VOLUME VIII



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INTRODUCTION

As the academic year unfolds undergraduate essays became a prominent part of every students life. Many of these essays often end up feeling thankless and never ending. This years Future of History gives us an opportunity to examine the work of some students who made this part of undergraduate life their own. It too provides student an avenue outside the classroom for them to show the development of their interests and share any insights they have made with the undergraduate community. This years edition wanted to build upon the editions that came before it by continuing these traditions.

Equally, we sought to strike a balance in terms of the historical periods and regions. The journal hoped to do this by bringing in more examples of the work students studying periods and regions other than Contemporary North America and Europe.

Lastly, we would like to extend a thank you to our staff, financial supporters, and the student who once again provided us with wonderful range of submissions. I, myself, would like to wish next years Co-Directors, Marie Schoppen and Kyle Da Silva, the best of luck.

Peter Pangarov, Co-Director



GUIDELINES FOR FUTURE SUBMISSIONS

*Been wanting to get involved on campus
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- Up to two essay submissions per individual will be considered.
- Submissions for the 2013-2014 edition are due on January 31, 2014. Any essay received after that date will be considered for the following year’s edition, provided that the student submitting is still enrolled in an Undergraduate Program at the University of Toronto at that time.

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SYNTHESIS OF THOUGHT & ACTION:
MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN POLITICAL, MILITARY & THEOLOGICAL
COHESION FROM THE TIME OF THE FIRST CALIPHS TO THE
REIGN OF THE FATIMID EMPIRE

BY JOZEF A. KOSC

Much of contemporary popular writing on the history of Muslim-Christian relations in the Near East is marred with polemic obfuscation and inaccurate one-sided portrayals of significant events. Some would seek to paint the overall experience of Christian communities—stretching out over fourteen different centuries under Muslim political hegemony, in various regions and states throughout Asia Minor and the Near East—as one of universal disadvantage, if not outright exploitation under an unbroken imperialist regime of religious universalism.¹ Adherents to such polemic scholarship are quick to account for portentous events – such as the fourteenth-century campaigns of the Mongol potentate Tamerlane, which sought to (and largely succeeded) expunge Christian influence and presence from the Orient² – without providing a relevant historic and cultural context. It is invariably true that after the fall of the Abbasid Empire (brought down by internal political disorder, civil war and Mongol invasions which culminated in a final assault on Baghdad in 1258³) all of Near Eastern Christendom fell into a cultural, social and economic backwater – the miserable state of which was only perpetuated for the next seven centuries by Ottoman disregard for the economic and cultural wellbeing of territories beyond the immediate Turkish land of Asia Minor. But one would be naïve to portray the entire history of Muslim-Christian relations in the Near East as decidedly confrontational or even universally unilateral in its power structure. The following exposition will seek to outline a clear thread of social, economic and religious cohesion and symbiosis between foreign Muslim conquerors, Islamic overseers and the native Christian ahl al-kitāb⁴ of the lands of Syria, Egypt, Palestine and Iran. Beginning with the period of the first four caliphs in the seventh century⁵ and stretching into the time of early-Umayyad expansionism, a close examination

1 Efraim Karsh, *Islamic Imperialism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), pp. 7, 25.

2 Ibid., p. 91.

3 Ibid., pp. 57-65.

4 “People of the Book.” A positive theological perspective within Islam towards Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians.

5 Collectively referred to as the “al-Khulafā’u r-Rāshidūn,” or “the Righteous Caliphs.”

of various primary and secondary sources reveals the widespread efforts of military collaboration between the subjugated Christians of Persia and Byzantium, and the incoming Arab invaders. Continuing under the Umayyad caliphate of the eighth century, and well into the Fatimid period of the tenth and eleventh centuries, Muslim-Christian social synthesis developed and blossomed within the public sphere of state political and local community administration, through the context of a high degree of commercial autonomy. Finally, Muslim-Christian theological synthesis, beginning in the Umayyad period and culminating in eleventh century Fatimid Egypt, will be explored through the particular lens of Coptic-Christian clerical and lay efforts to appropriate the Arabic cultural language as a means of religious survival and dialogue with Muslim apologists.

In the eastern lands of the Persian Empire, ravaged by a series of extended wars with the Byzantines—the last of which had decimated the military capacity of both world powers from 602 until 628 AD—Nestorian Christians had long suffered persecution under Sasanian overlords.⁶ It is of no surprise, therefore, that local Christian communities across Iran freely welcomed the newfound political stability that came with the Arab invasions of the seventh century.⁷ Further to the west, the Arab military conquest of Egypt and Syria was not only welcomed by local Christian communities once within the strict legalistic confines of Byzantine administration, but was even facilitated in many unique instances of local armed resistance against dwindling Byzantine forces. In the Syrian city of Emesa, the local Christian community barred the re-entry of Heraclius' troops, which desperately sought to reconquer its fallen walls from the Muslim invaders.⁸ The *Futūh al-Buldān* vividly recounts this wilful offering of Emesa and countless other nearby Syrian communities into the hands of Muslim governors by their Christian citizens, for purely practical reasons of safety, wellbeing and the preferential treatment of the Arab conquerors:

When Heraclius gathered his troops against the Muslims... the people of Hims replied: "We prefer your rule and your justice to the oppression and injustice under which we were formerly. And we shall surely repel Heraclius' army from the

6 Norman A. Stillman, *The Jews of Arab Lands: A History and Source Book* (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1979), pp. 22-23.

7 Ibid, pp. 22-23.

8 al-Balādhurī, "Futūh al-Buldān," *The Jews of Arab Lands: A History and Source Book*, trans. Norman A. Stillman (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1979), p. 153.

city, with the help of your governor.”...Then they locked the gates and set guards over them. The people of the other cities which had surrendered to the Muslims, both Christians and Jews, did likewise, saying, “If the Byzantines and their followers [Greek Orthodox Christians] are victorious over the Muslims, we shall revert to our former state. If they are not, then we shall retain control of our own affairs as long as the Muslims maintain their forces.”⁹

Across Syria and Egypt, many local Christian capitulations to Muslim forces took on the example of Sophronios, the Patriarch of Jerusalem, who first surrendered the holy city and its surrounding territories of Palestine in the mid-seventh century to the second caliph, Umar bin al-Khattab, in exchange for military and administrative protection.¹⁰ The conditions of surrender, enshrined within the Pact of Umar, became the basis of the later-developed dhimma system of political administration later employed by all Muslim rulers.¹¹

It is no surprise why the Coptic and Syriac Orthodox (also known as Jacobite) Christians of Syria and Egypt so easily capitulated to the Dar al-Islam¹² and abandoned the chains of the purported Dar al-Harb.¹³ The Trinitarian and Christological ecclesiastical councils of the fourth and fifth century had divided all of Christendom, from Rome to Asia Minor; although, after the Council of Chalcedon in 451 AD, fractions and schisms occurred with particular magnitude across the Near East. The vast majority of Syrian and Egyptian Christians were Monophysites who rejected the precepts of Chalcedon, and who therefore considered themselves oppressed under the rule of a predominantly Greek Orthodox Byzantium,¹⁴ which often enforced discriminatory legislation against both Christian communities deemed heretical, as well as their non-Christian and Jewish counterparts.¹⁵ Many of these civil and social restrictions inspired the legalistic subjugation of the

9 Stillman, *The Jews of Arab Lands: A History and Source Book*, p. 153.

10 Ibid., pp. 157-158.

11 al-Balādhurī, “Futūh al-Buldān,” *The Jews of Arab Lands: A History and Source Book*, trans. Norman A. Stillman (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1979), pp. 157-158.

12 “House of Islam.”

13 “House of War.” Muslim reference to Byzantium in the time of the seventh and eighth century conquests.

14 Stillman, *The Jews of Arab Lands: A History and Source Book*, p. 22.

15 Ibid., p. 26.

ahl al-dhimma by future Muslim rulers.¹⁶ Nonetheless, the actual application of the dhimma system during the reign of the first four caliphs and soon thereafter in the early years of the Umayyad caliphate was much less consistent, and thereby much less inhibiting, than the heavy-handed and structured discrimination by-and-large characteristic of Byzantine authorities.¹⁷

It should be noted, however, that support for the Arab conquest of Byzantine lands was not entirely widespread amongst the various Christian communities of the Near East, though such was predominantly the case. A notable exception can be found within extracts from the seventh-century West-Syrian Maronite Chronicle, which recounts Maronite support for Byzantine defensive efforts across Syria.¹⁸ The reasoning behind such support is likewise theological in nature. Unlike the Monophysite Christian communities which had rejected Chalcedon and remained in schism with the Orthodox Church of Byzantium for more than two centuries before the Arab invasions, the Maronites did not separate from the Greek Orthodox Church on matters of doctrine until the Third Council of Constantinople in 680/1 AD¹⁹ and therefore were not seen to be heretical and politically subordinate. The Chronicle, written approximately two decades before the Maronite rejection of the Sixth Council, provides a rare glimpse of contrast between the desperately hopeful situation of Maronite-Byzantine collaborators with that of the aforementioned schismatic Syriac Orthodox Church of Antioch. In the case of the latter establishment, ecclesiastical discrimination by the Byzantines, coupled with preferential treatment by the Arab invaders, culminated in the eventual mass-capitulation of the Jacobites to the political authority of the first Umayyad caliph, who offered continuous military protection in exchange for tributary payments:

When the Jacobites were defeated, Muawiya [the first Umayyad caliph] ordered them to pay 20,000 denarii and commanded them to be silent. Thus there arose the custom that the Jacobite bishops should pay that sum of gold every year to Muawiya, so that he would not withdraw his protection and let them be persecuted by the members of the Orthodox Church.²⁰

16 Stillman, *The Jews of Arab Lands: A History and Source Book*, p. 26.

17 Ibid., p. 26.

18 "Maronite Chronicle," in *The Seventh Century in the West-Syrian Chronicles*, ed. Andrew Palmer (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1993), pp. 30-35.

19 Andrew Palmer, *The Seventh Century in the West-Syrian Chronicles* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1993), p. 29.

20 "Maronite Chronicle," p. 30.

With the exception of a select few Christian minorities tied to Byzantium for theological reasons, the vast majority of Christians across Syria, Palestine and Egypt either tacitly welcomed the demise of their former Byzantine rulers or else actively collaborated militarily to assist in Arab conquests of Byzantine lands. In the east, Nestorian Christians likewise preferred relatively peaceful Muslim rule to the open persecution of the Sasanians.

Perhaps a result of military tact on the part of a largely decentralized Arab militia,²¹ and no doubt influenced by an ambiguous theological precept which at once enforces subjugation upon the ahl al-dhimma,²² but also offers protection to the very same ahl al-kitāb; Christians under Umayyad control not only found themselves with military protection against external forces of suppression, but also with relatively high levels of social and political autonomy within their individual religious communities.²³ As such, Christian-Muslim social synthesis and symbiosis often occurred publicly at high levels of state administration, and specifically within the realm of civil taxation. The protection and freedom of worship afforded to semi-autonomous Christian enclaves by local imams (by way of proxy from the caliph in power) was conditional upon the payment of a tributary poll tax, known as the *jizya*, as well as the irregular payment of a land tax known as the *kharaj*.²⁴ Countless primary and secondary sources reveal the singular role of local bishops, patriarchs and ecclesiastical leaders in administering this Islamic tax collection amongst their faithful. The aforementioned West-Syrian Maronite Chronicle notes, for example: “The person called ‘patriarch’ by the Jacobites fixed the financial burden that all the convents of monks and nuns should contribute each year towards the payment in gold and he did the same with all the adherents of his faith.”²⁵ More tellingly, the eighth century Islamic historian Abu Yusuf provides the very blueprint for the collection of the *jizya* in his *Kitab al-Kharaj*, which reads as follows:

With regard to collecting the *jizya* in the major cities...the Imam should entrust it to some man of integrity in each city, one of its good and trustworthy citizens, whose piety and fidelity can be depended upon [no doubt, one with a

21 Stillman, *The Jews of Arab Lands: A History and Source Book*, p. 26.

22 “Fight against those to whom the Scriptures were given...until they pay tribute...and are humbled,” *Sura 9:p. 29*.

23 Bernard Lewis, *The Jews of Islam* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 20.

24 Stillman, *The Jews of Arab Lands: A History and Source Book*, p. 25.

25 “Maronite Chronicle,” p. 30.

high ecclesiastical office]. Assistants should be appointed for him who are to gather the adherents of the different faiths, namely the...Christians...and collect from them...²⁶

The Kitab al-Kharaj also provides another unique insight into why the native Christians of the Near East would prefer the condition of ahl al-dhimma to that of persecution under the Byzantines. It is noted that the "...jizya should be collected in accordance with their profession or commerce—forty-eight dirhams from the well-to-do and twenty-four from those with middle income...Twelve dirhams are to be collected from such manual workers as tailors, dyers, shoemakers, and cobblers..."²⁷ A progressive tax system which catered to the needs of the working poor, applied by the local ecclesiastical leadership, was no doubt a sign of communal social autonomy under Muslim state oversight, as well as a widespread and clear example of Christian-Muslim political cohesion throughout the first few centuries of Islamic hegemony.

As a result of the general economic autonomy provided for Christian enclaves by the dhimma system, many Christians were able to enter and maintain their status within the upper classes of the socio-economic order. Others too found themselves with high-ranking government offices, or worked within the service of government officials as physicians, attendants and secretaries.²⁸ This practice became rooted within the Umayyad period, although continued well thereafter, into the tenth and eleventh centuries under various Fatimid caliphs. A prominent example from the early Fatimid era can be found within the case of Isa ibn Nestorius, a Christian appointed to the most-esteemed office of vizier of the Fatimid Empire under both Caliph al-Aziz as well as Caliph al-Hakim.²⁹ Al-Aziz was well known for appointing a Christian secretary, and likewise appointed a Jewish deputy to represent his will in the Syrian lands.³⁰ Paradoxically, the text of al-Radd ala 'l-Nasara—a polemic against the Christian faith and its adherents—nevertheless accounts for this development: "One of the reasons why the masses respect them (the Christians) and...have affection for them is that among them are to be found

26 Abu Yusuf, "Kitab al-Kharaj," in *The Jews of Arab Lands: A History and Source Book*, ed. Norman A. Stillman (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1979), p. 160.

27 al-Jahiz, "al-Radd ala 'l-Nasara" in *The Jews of Arab Lands: A History and Source Book*, ed. Norman A. Stillman (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1979), pp. 160-161.

28 Ibid., p. 170.

29 Stillman, *The Jews of Arab Lands: A History and Source Book*, p. 200.

30 Ibid., p. 200.

government secretaries, attendants of kings, physicians of nobles, perfumers, and bankers..."³¹

Although for the most part, Christian communities experienced religious, social and economic freedom alongside political cohesion within the Muslim state, it would be inaccurate to surmise that Muslim authorities did not, from time to time, intrude on religious customs and appointments for political reasons. Due to opposition from the caliph, for example, the seats of the Orthodox patriarchates of Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem (those Chalcedon-adhering dioceses which remained on the ground despite the political dissolution of the Byzantine Empire) were at various times left unoccupied.³² Likewise, there was the unique case of the Nestorian Patriarch Khanishu, who was imprisoned and replaced by the Umayyad Caliph Abd al-Malik.³³ Nevertheless, such instances were few and far between throughout the seventh and eighth centuries, and Christians overall experienced the benefits of social, economic and religious freedom, alongside military protection, as a result of Muslim-Christian cohesion in the realm of civil taxation and administration.

Perhaps most curiously, early Near Eastern Christian-Muslim synthesis occurred beyond the day-to-day practices of political administration and rational military factionalism, and in the often esoteric realm of theological discourse between Christian scholars, ecclesiastics and apologists, alongside their Muslim counterparts. Beginning in the late Umayyad period, the Coptic Christians of Egypt began to lose the proclivity of their native vernacular and liturgical tongue as Arabic fast became the lingua franca of everyday life. With the widespread inculcation of a decidedly Islamic-Arabic cultural vernacular, the Coptic Church began to lose the unity of its believers.³⁴ The catechetical Book of the Elucidation—itsself written in Arabic—decries the sordid state of doctrinal disunity amongst Coptic congregations by the time of Fatimid rule in Egypt, only a few generations after the initial spread of Arabic as the language of commerce:

My friend, you mentioned that at the current time different statements about the orthodox faith have grown numerous

31 al-Jahiz, "al-Radd ala 'l-Nasara," p. 170.

32 Demetrios J. Constantelos, "The Muslim Conquests of the Near East as Revealed in the Greek Sources of the Seventh and the Eighth Centuries," *Byzantion* 42, pt. 2 (1972): p. 336.

33 Ibid., p. 346.

34 Stephen J. Davis, *Coptic Christology in Practice: Incarnation and Divine Participation in Late Antique and Medieval Egypt* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 201.

among the Copts, that one Copt holds an opinion different from another and calls him an unbeliever, and that you are astonished and perplexed about that. Do not be astonished: the reason for this is their ignorance of their language, for the Arabic language has subdued them. Not one among them remains who knows what is read to him in church in the Coptic language. They have become like those who listen but do not understand.³⁵

As a matter of religious survival, Coptic clerics began to appropriate the use of Arabic into liturgical texts; meanwhile, catechisms, lectionaries, canon collections, and orders of service were translated into and published in Arabic for use by the laity of local Christian communities.³⁶ By the early tenth century, entire florilegia³⁷ of Arabic Christian documents were produced by scholars such as Sāwīrus ibn al-Muqaffa.³⁸ The renowned Coptic writer was also the very first historically-documented author of original works on Coptic theology and church history in the Arabic language.³⁹ Writing profusely on the topics of Christology and Patristics, Sāwīrus very clearly wrote within the context of an Islamic-Arabic cultural framework, and paved the way for much future synthesis in Arabic works of Christian-Muslim discourse.

It is of no surprise that the synthesis of Christian and Muslim theology within newly published works of disputation ventured far beyond the mere appropriation of the Arabic language and cultural vernacular. As the ultimate objective or *raison d'être* of Christian apologetics is the isolation, definition and clarification of Christian doctrine within a specific cultural context,⁴⁰ it is only natural that works of Christian apologetics—authored by Coptic ecclesiastics and scholars in the tenth and eleventh centuries to educate the ever-so-ignorant faithful—argued theological tenets on the basis of popular Islamic terminology and Muslim apologetic methodology. In his *History of the Councils*, the aforementioned Sāwīrus ibn al-Muqaffa uses the vocabulary of the Qurʾān itself to defend the Christian scriptures against popular Muslim charges of *ifsād* (corruption), *taḥrīf* (distortion) and *tabdīl* (substitution).⁴¹ Likewise, he compares the venerable traditions

35 Davis, *Coptic Christology in Practice*., p. 201.

36 Ibid., p. 202.

37 Latin term in popular use at the time, equivalent to “anthology.”

38 Davis, *Coptic Christology in Practice*, pp. 201, 206.

39 Ibid., p. 203.

40 Ibid., pp. 211-212.

41 Ibid., p. 212.

of Christendom—its councils, creeds and the writings of Church Fathers—to the various Muslim hadiths;⁴² extra-canonical writings which nonetheless convey teachings of authority upon Muslims through their representation of the various personal accounts of the life of Muhammad.⁴³ Even more powerfully, Sāwīrus extols in *The Lamp of Understanding*: “The Torah and the rest of the Scriptures that our teachers prescribed are the writings (kitāb) and speech (kalām) of God, his laws (sharā’i’) and established traditions (sunan), his divine precepts (farā’id) and judgments (aḥkām).”⁴⁴

Not only did Sāwīrus incorporate the use of Islamic terminology into his works of apologetics, but he appropriated the very grammatical and stylistic structure of Islamic apologetic texts. In his aforementioned *History of the Councils*, Sāwīrus employs the use of ilm al-kalām,⁴⁵ a dialectic question-and-answer style of writing unique amongst early-Medieval Muslim apologists and philosophers.⁴⁶ He proceeds to define a series of barāhīn (proofs) about Christological precepts, through the presentation of dilālah (evidence) in a systemic manner of dialogue between his own character and a nameless opponent.⁴⁷ Eventually, the use of ilm al-kalām in Christian works of apologetics, and in particular, in critical responses to anti-Christian Muslim theological critiques, became a widespread and popular norm.⁴⁸

Conclusively, through the examination of a series of primary and secondary sources, as well as through the analysis of the history of early Muslim expansionism throughout the Near East, one arrives at a definitive conclusion of military, civil, political, economic and theological synthesis between the Christian ahl al-kitāb of the Near East and its broader cultural framework of the Dar al-Islam. From administrative cohesion in the realm of taxation by local ecclesiastical authorities under Umayyad hegemony, to theological discourse on the basis of a shared cultural vernacular in Fatimid Egypt, to the outright anti-Byzantine military factionalism of seventh century Monophysite Christians, the various native Christian communities of the regions of Syria, Egypt, Palestine and Iran have often collaborated—actively and tacitly—with their Muslim-Arab overseers, to attain and maintain by-and-large high levels of socio-economic rank, mobility and autonomy throughout the first few centuries of Islam.

42 Davis, *Coptic Christology in Practice*, p. 212.

43 Collectively known as the *Sunna*.

44 Davis, *Coptic Christology in Practice*, p. 212.

45 Arabic for “the science of discourse.”

46 Davis, *Coptic Christology in Practice*, 213.

47 Ibid., pp. 213-214.

48 Ibid., p. 213.

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POST-CONTACT ABORIGINAL WITCHCRAFT AS A TOOL TO ADAPT, COPE, AND UNIFY

BY ADAM M. KEELING

Beginning in the sixteenth century, European influences in the Great Lakes region spurred transition and adaptation among many of the area's resident Aboriginal societies. Alongside forcing changes in regional power dynamics, Europeans, in addition, brought both waves of epidemics that devastated local populations, and missionaries who challenged the very core of traditional Aboriginal beliefs. Witchcraft and the rooting out of witches evidently became a tool used to both explain these changes, as well as to help redefine what it meant to be an Aboriginal. Witchcraft and ideas of malevolent power were well known concepts among both Aboriginals and European Christians; witchcraft for Aboriginal societies, for example, was a method through which to understand those workings of the world which lacked a tangible cause. In the early post-contact period, Jesuit missionaries among the Huron-Wendat were sometimes viewed with suspicion because their presence seemed to be linked with sudden outbreaks of disease. That being said, Jesuit missionaries were also viewed as persons of power, and as such fit within the spiritual framework that Aboriginals already understood. Conversely, there are also examples of Aboriginal groups adopting Christianity, while rejecting traditional forms of spiritualism. Those that adopted Christian custom were reacting to the changing political and social landscape, many struggling with their own spiritual traditions and adapting to understand the new European components of their changing world. After the disarray among Aboriginal groups following the American Revolution, there emerged two prophets who used witchcraft and witch-hunts to galvanize support for their views. Both the Shawnee prophet Tenskatawa and the Seneca prophet Handsome Lake used these concepts to build solidarity and distinguish unwanted influences. Both prophets used witchcraft to cope with the changing nature of life after the tumult of the American Revolution. From these examples there is evidence that witchcraft was used as a coping tool, which helped Aboriginal peoples understand change within a well-known spiritual framework. Witchcraft provided tangible enemies, while also building consensus and solidarity amongst the people.

Witchcraft has long been an important aspect of Aboriginal spiritual life in the Great Lakes region. It played an important role in diagnosing illness, which was said to be caused either naturally, from want of desire, or by the malevolent actions of a witch.¹ If the illness was not

1 David Blanchard, "Who or What's a Witch? Iroquois Persons of Power," *American Indian Quarterly* 6 (1982): 225, accessed 26 October 2012.

immediately cured then the most likely consideration was witchcraft. George S. Snyderman, in “Witches, Witchcraft, and Allegany Seneca Medicine,” refers to this as a “catchall” for unexplained phenomenon, and notes that this method of attributing illnesses to acts of witchcraft was practiced among a great number of Aboriginal groups.² Jesuit Father Ragenau also noted this system, claiming that “if [Aboriginals] be not soon cured of disease ... they at once say that some sorcerer had a hand in it.”³ This illustrates how accusations of witchcraft can be construed as a mechanism for understanding afflictions that would otherwise be inexplicable. Aboriginals aimed to live a good life, but when this life was interrupted by illness or misfortune there was the need for explanation.⁴ Witchcraft allowed for the afflicted to situate his or her circumstance within a context they could understand. This is an important mechanism for coping with the unknown, providing a release from the pressures that arose as a result of conflicts within Aboriginal societies.

The solidarity which existed between witches was an important release for the pressures created by unexplained events. Annemarie Shimony refers to this as the “ever-present fear of malevolent forces” and how “the techniques of control make use of many traditional beliefs and institutions which are thus preserved.”⁵ Alfred Cave notes that accusations of witchcraft provide a “powerful means of social control” by making a clear distinction between good and evil.⁶ Matthew Dennis, as well, asserts that “Both male and female witches inspire near universal fear among Iroquoians, and those suspected of such maleficence were hated and avoided.”⁷ This created an intense and pervasive fear of witches and witchcraft. The liturgy of this detection and the offending witch’s execution provide both legitimacy to the process and a sense of satisfaction for the afflicted. For example, a witch is detected by another person of great power.⁸ This is a significant revelation, because it exposed a tangible cause and validated the fear of the afflicted. This also solidified the place of the legitimate exercise of spiritual power by people like shamans. The fear of witches and witchcraft is also tied to suspicions and questioning of long

2 George S. Snyderman, “Witches, Witchcraft, and Allegany Seneca Medicine,” *American Philosophical Society* 4 (1983): 263, accessed 3 November 2012.

3 Ibid, 264.

4 Ibid, 263.

5 Annemarie Shimony, “Eastern Woodlands: Iroquois of Six Nations,” in *Witchcraft and Sorcery of the American Native Peoples*, ed Walker Jr., Deward E. (Moscow, Idaho: University of Idaho Press), 144.

6 Alfred A. Cave, “The Failure of the Shawnee Prophet’s Witch-Hunt,” *Ethnohistory* 3(1995): 465, accessed October 26, 2012.

7 Matthew Dennis, “American Indians, Witchcraft, and Witch-Hunting,” *OAH Magazine of History* 4(2003): 22, accessed 26 October 2012.

8 Blanchard, “Who or What’s a Witch?”, 232.

held traditions; these accusations were sometimes directed toward rituals as Christian influence grew.

In some cases, Aborigines agreed with the European view that some rituals were devil-worship, and it was out of these views that witchcraft accusations grew.⁹ A group of Algonquian peoples in New England embraced Christianity as part of their changing world in the seventeenth century.¹⁰ As these Aborigines adopted many new Christian ideas, there came a need to justify the appeal of these ideas over the those by which they were replaced. Piumbukhou, one of the “praying Indians of New England”, rejected Aboriginal rituals and witchcraft as devil worship, reinterpreting an Algonquian word which may be associated with capture and torture to be a vision of hell.¹¹ Since witches and witchcraft existed previously in Aboriginal cultures, the connection between ideas of sin, punishment, and devil worship reconciled Aboriginal beliefs with the Christian ones Aborigines had adopted. There is also the larger picture of Aborigines themselves in New England: as the influence of missionaries and white settlers strengthened, many Aborigines came to see themselves within a new world. Witchcraft was then interpreted in a fashion that suited the changing times – something which a rejection of tradition simply reflected. Conversely, other situations seemed to reject Christian influences, and instead cast suspicion on Europeans. This was a coping mechanism, which served to help some Aborigines understand the changing period by placing blame on Christians.

Accusations against Christians were most notable among the missionized Huron-Wendat. They were often viewed with suspicion as their proximity to Aboriginal societies seemed to coincide with outbreaks of disease. This reflected the many outbreaks which characterized the arrival of European missionaries and traders among the Huron-Wendat. Paul LeJeune reported in 1638 that the niece of one of their first Christian converts in the village they occupied in 1637 had died of disease. Shortly thereafter, the convert’s wife, daughter, and brother-in-law all also died,¹² despite the relative comfort in which the family lived – which, presumably, was due to access to European goods afforded to the convert by his position as a trader, and his close association with the Jesuits.¹³ However, this close

9 Amanda Porterfield, “Witchcraft and the Colonization of Algonquian and Iroquois Cultures.” *Religion and American Culture: A Journal of Interpretation* 4(1992): 104, accessed 26 October 2012.

10 Ibid, 115.

11 Ibid, 115-16.

12 Paul leJeune, “Relation of what occurred in the Mission of the Society of Jesus in the Country of the Hurons, in the year 1637 and 38.” in *The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents: Travels and Explorations of the Jesuit Missionaries in New France 1610—1791*, ed. Reuben Gold Thwaites (Cleveland: The Burrows Brothers), pp. 19-21.

13 Ibid.

relationship gave weight to the suspicions that fell on the Jesuits. There were no outright accusations noted in Le Jeune's Relation, but the reported behaviour in response suggested he believed Christians were the source of the suspicion. It was noted that one village refused to use the kettles traded to them by the French.¹⁴ Le Jeune says they were "imagining that everything which came in any way from us was capable of communicating the disease to them."¹⁵ However, this was a very European understanding of disease. As noted earlier, unexplained illness was often interpreted by Aborigines as being the product of witchcraft, and there was also a fundamental belief by Aborigines in charms capable of causing harm. Charms, when used by a witch, could be directed to cause harm; but, they could also cause harm by themselves.¹⁶ Charms were a reflection of Aboriginal belief systems because they were considered non-human persons, and as such had their place within Aboriginal spirituality.¹⁷ So, the village's refusal to stop using these French kettles reflected a broader understanding of objects as vehicles for harm, rather than the transmission of disease. Le Jeune reports another anecdote of someone from the Tobacco Nation who believed himself the object of French witchcraft after regurgitating a bloody pellet.¹⁸ He also mentions the almost daily reports of similar stories from other villages. Disease is a constant undertone in Relation, which ties the idea of witchcraft to the actions and feelings reported by Aborigines. Father Breboul, a prominent Jesuit among the Huron-Wendat, was often viewed as a witch, but his power and position among converted Huron-Wendat allowed his spiritual clout to marginalize these accusations.¹⁹ The Jesuit Isaac Jogues was killed by the Mohawks because of suspicion of his malevolent spiritual power, but also because he lacked the position among the Haudenosaunee that Brebeuf had among the Huron-Wendat.²⁰ This shows the connection that some Aborigines drew between the epidemics of the time and the arrival and influence of the Jesuits. However, this connection was not simply limited to the Jesuits themselves.

Christian converts themselves were also targets. One convert, Chihwatenha, continued working with the Jesuits despite threats, and was believed to have been killed as a result.²¹ In this way, the trauma experienced by disease can be explained through accusations of witchcraft because of the way Aboriginal peoples understood the relationship between witchcraft

14 LeJeune, "Relation ... in the Year 1637 and 38", p. 21.

15 Ibid.

16 Shimony, "Eastern Woodlands", p. 151.

17 Blanchard, "Who or What's a Witch?", p. 230.

18 LeJeune, "Relation ... in the Year 1637 and 38", p. 21.

19 Porterfield, "Witchcraft and Colonization", p. 111.

20 Dennis, "American Indians", p.22.

21 Ibid.

and the concepts of spiritualism. Witchcraft also became prominent during later times of change.

The period following the American Revolution saw massive changes in Aboriginal societies. Here, the emergence of prophets in this period remains unsurprising, as Aboriginals struggled to understand the new situations in which they found themselves. The prophets Tenskwatawa and Handsome Lake reflected this through their attempts to build social solidarity during these times. They both came to prominence in the years immediately before the War of 1812: for Tenskwatawa, it was 1805 when he began to preach his visions;²² while for Handsome Lake it was in 1799.²³ Interestingly, both Tenskwatawa and Handsome Lake had previously lived considerably depraved lives, and each heavily abused alcohol.²⁴ Tenskwatawa spoke of a punishment of Aboriginals that stemmed from the displeasure of the Great Spirit – a spirit that viewed Aboriginals who associated with whites the “spawn of a malevolent Great Serpent.”²⁵ European goods, practices, and values were then off limits. Handsome Lake’s preaching, by contrast, were not made with the same anti-European tone. Tenskwatawa preached a moral code that was fairly patriarchal and contained many ideas seemingly borrowed from Christianity – like, for example, condemning practices such as premarital sex and polygamy.²⁶ Tenskwatawa, however, rejected key European concepts like private property and money.²⁷ In this way, he adopted only some European ideas of morality into an Aboriginal context. This was an attempt to redefine society during this tumultuous time, and do so in a way that was familiar to his followers. Handsome Lake’s visions also promoted a similarly themed moral code. Lake’s ideas included conceptions of heaven and hell while also focusing on morality from a patriarchal lens. Tooker referred to these beliefs as distinctly Christian and non-Iroquoian ideas, but it is useful to consider how Christianity overtime had shaped Aboriginal perceptions of these issues.²⁸ It is possible that the tumult of the period allowed these ideas to gain acceptance while Aboriginals considered how to define themselves in changing times. While both Tenskwatawa and Handsome Lake’s preaching can both be seen as types of social organization amidst the tumult of the period, the fear of witchcraft was prevalent among followers of both these prophets, and

22 Alfred A. Cave, “The Shawnee Prophet, Tecumseh, and Tippecanoe: A Case Study of Historical Myth-Making.” *Journal of the Early Republic* 4(2002): 641, accessed 26 October 2012.

23 Elisabeth Tooker, “On the New Religion of Handsome Lake.” *Anthropological Quarterly* 4(1968): 187, accessed 26 October 2012.

24 Cave, “The Shawnee Prophet”, 641.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid., 642-643.

27 Cave, “Failure”, p. 452.

28 Tooker, “On the New Religion of Handsome Lake”, 192.

indeed played a central role in their influences.

Tenskwatawa often preached against witchcraft, and attempted to wield power through witch-hunts. He believed that his revelations had given him the power to find witches;²⁹ however, as Alfred Cave points out in “The Failure of the Shawnee Prophet’s Witch-Hunt”, recent interpretations cast doubt onto the actual effectiveness of these accusations.³⁰ Tenskwatawa’s claims were radical and divisive, to the extent that “all Indians who refused to follow these regulations were to be considered bad people and not worthy to live and be put to death.”³¹ He opposed traditional methods of spiritual interaction such as the medicine bags used by Shamans and some Chiefs.³² His accusations and denouncements were a direct attack on traditional spiritualism. As such, his incitement of witch-hunts at White River among the Delaware created opposition from both traditionalists as well as those favouring co-operation with the Moravian missionaries of the area who, as outsiders, were subject to suspicion of witchcraft.³³ As noted earlier, Tenskwatawa’s visions were distinctly anti-European – accusations of witchcraft, then, were merely a way of distinguishing between the old order (which Tenskwatawa sought to reform) and his ideals by imposing a good/bad dichotomy on the situation. This is especially evident in his retelling of the story of “The Great Monster Rising out of the Sea,” and how he equated it with the arrival of Europeans.³⁴ Tenskwatawa’s message, in an indication of its power and endurance, remained popular even despite the limited appeal of his witch-hunts and a military loss at Tippecanoe.³⁵ Despite the limited or even counter-productive efforts of his witch hunts, the message he spread was appealing. This blending of tradition and European moral ideas is also present in Handsome Lake’s preaching, as he tried to build consensus through witch-hunts and the fear of witches.

Handsome Lake also made fear of witches a central part of his preaching. To him, witches represented the failure of the old ways and a potential threat to society.³⁶ F. C. Wallace, as noted by Cave, felt “the virulence of Handsome Lake’s hatred of witches was unbounded. He believed that ... witches were agents of the Evil spirit, responsible for almost all sickness and disease and working to destroy the world itself.”³⁷ He also rejected the use of charms either in witchcraft or as a positive aid.³⁸

29 Cave, “Failure”, 451.

30 Ibid, 446.

31 Ibid, 452.

32 Ibid, 452–453.

33 Ibid, 458.

34 Porterfield, “Witchcraft and Colonization”, 113.

35 Cave, “Shawnee Prophet”, 672.

36 Cave, “Failure”, 449–450.

37 Ibid, 450.

38 Tooker, “On the New Religion of Handsome Lake”, 188.

Handsome Lake's accusations were not always successful. His accusation that Red Jacket, a speaker of the Seneca Nation, practiced witchcraft was rejected by the Seneca Council.³⁹ Red Jacket's position gave him a degree of influence; it is likely Handsome Lake saw him as a rival and wished to use the accusation to remove him. Handsome Lake received his moral code through a series of visions, representing an interpretation and blending of traditional and Christian morals, such as the increasingly gendered accusations of witchcraft. This reflects his preaching of a patriarchal social order.⁴⁰ This is in contrast to traditional Aboriginal views of witches, which were not gender specific.⁴¹ Indeed, there is some conjecture that his decision to leave Coldspring for Tonawanda was due to his part in the killing of an old woman accused of being a witch.⁴² That he used witchcraft as a way to galvanize support against competing ideas and peoples indicates the usefulness of as a tool in that regard. Through these accusations, Lake was able to indoctrinate Christian values into a code that was distinctly Aboriginal and non-European. This was an important adaptation that helped to unify the communities that his teachings touched.

Throughout the post-contact period witchcraft was used as a tool for coping, understanding, and unifying. Ill effects of illnesses were often explained by witchcraft, which served as an important way of understanding the unknown in a context that an Aboriginal person would understand. These fears often reflected conflict within society, and accusations of witchcraft provided a means of relieving these pressures without triggering the retaliation that violence normally elicited. Some Aboriginals chose to adopt Christian values and reject tradition. These Christian converts were exercising a mechanism that provided a very real benefit and understanding of this changing world. Yet, other groups chose to reject these same Christian ideas, and viewed Europeans as witches; they saw a very real connection between Europeans and the sickness that often followed their arrival. Finally, witchcraft was used as a tool to build consensus around new systems of belief following the American Revolution and the tumult it created within Aboriginal groups. Both the Shawnee prophet Tenskwatawa and the Seneca Prophet Handsome Lake embraced witch-hunting as a way to clearly define undesirables, while at the same time promoted an internalization of European and Aboriginal values reflecting the changing times. Throughout the post-contact period, fear of witchcraft has been used, both successfully and unsuccessfully, as a means to cope, understand, and unify.

39 Cave, "Failure", 450–451.

40 Dennis, "American Indians", 23.

41 Ibid, 22.

42 Tooker, "On the Development of the Handsome Lake Religion." *American Philosophical Society* 1(1989): 38, accessed 3 November 2012.

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NAPOLEON III, THE REBUILDING OF PARIS, AND THE FRENCH WORKING CLASS

BY MISHA BOUTILLIER

The Second Empire was an epoch of intense change in French society. It saw the introduction of new technologies, sweeping economic transformations, rapid industrial development, and novel social challenges, such that the period is considered a "sea-change."¹ Nowhere were these changes more pronounced than in Paris, which Emperor Napoleon III and Prefect of the Seine Baron Georges Haussmann transformed from a medieval city to a modern capital in the span of less than 20 years.² However, their aims in rebuilding Paris with respect to the working class, and the success of those aims, have always been controversial. Many scholars have emphasized Napoleon III's and Haussmann's obsession with security and military control of rebellious working class districts as paramount in guiding the rebuilding plan.³ Others have argued that the Paris Commune of 1871 was a direct result of the anger of Parisian workers at the rebuilding program that left them deprived of affordable housing and removed them out of the city centre into peripheral slums.⁴


these arguments neglect the importance of Napoleon III's views on

1 Alain Plessis, *The Rise and Fall of the Second Empire, 1852-1871*, trans. Jonathan Mandelbaum, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 3.

2 J.M. Chapman and Brian Chapman, *The Life and Times of Baron Haussmann*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1957), p. 3.

3 James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), p. 61.

4 David P. Jordan, *Transforming Paris: The Life and Labors of Baron Haussmann*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 343.



the social question and his political need to gain the loyalty of the working class. While the Emperor was certainly concerned with increasing security to avoid revolution, he also aimed to win the loyalty of the working class by creating jobs for them and improving the urban environment. Certainly, the impacts of the rebuilding were mixed, and the workers had many legitimate grievances, but the rebuilding program delivered real benefits to workers in the form of employment, increased sanitation and hygiene, infrastructure improvements, and economic growth. While Napoleon III never won over the Parisian proletariat, most workers still preferred the Second Empire to the alternative of a bourgeois-dominated republican government that would show no real concern for workers. Indeed, the Emperor was able to minimize class warfare and never fully alienated workers, as his republican successor Adolphe Thiers did during the Paris Commune. Moreover, though the rebuilding program did not stop the Communards from seizing the city or setting up barricades, it did prevent street riots during the Second Empire and allowed the Versaillais to defeat the Communards.

To properly understand the Second Empire, it is first necessary to consider the course of French history following the downfall of Napoleon I. The Bourbon Restoration saw the return to influence of the ultra-royalist clerical-aristocratic faction that aimed to totally restore the old regime and reduce the power of the bourgeoisie. The Ultras' power intensified following the death of the more moderate King Louis XVIII and the accession of his arch-reactionary brother Charles X to the throne in 1824.⁵ However, Charles' regressive attempts to reduce the power and influence of the middle class provoked the liberal July Revolution that overthrew the Bourbons and placed the pro-bourgeois Orleans royal Louis Philippe on the throne.⁶ The July Monarchy was dominated by the wealthiest echelons of the bourgeoisie. "Get rich!" Prime Minister Francois Guizot urged the middle-class, and as France industrialized, the government of Louis Philippe and Guizot protected manufacturers' interests while ignoring those of workers.⁷ As the misery of Parisian workers increased and the city became increasingly overcrowded, Guizot failed to recognize the existence of a "social question" and responded to workers' protests by brute force and repression.⁸

While in 1848 the February Revolution expelled Louis Philippe and established the Second Republic, the conflict between the bourgeoisie

5 James F. McMillan, *Napoleon III*, (New York: Longman, 1991), pp. 20-21.

6 McMillan, *Napoleon III*, p. 21

7 *Ibid.*, p. 23.

8 Jordan, *Transforming Paris*, p. 98.

and the working class intensified instead of diminishing. Parisian workers, suffering high rates of unemployment, demanded jobs, leading the government to create National Workshops.⁹ To the bourgeoisie, these workers were as the “vile multitude,” “dangerous classes,” and even “barbarians.” In other words, the bourgeoisie saw this class of people as an uncontrolled mob who threatened their power and had the potential to overturn “society,” a concept which was narrowly constructed as limited to elite social circles.¹⁰ While workers called for a “social republic” in which the government would protect workers from vagaries of the market economy, most bourgeois were “political” republicans who favoured a laissez-faire approach to the economy.¹¹ In June, the bourgeois-dominated government cancelled the National Workshops, triggering an insurrection by the outraged workers of Paris. In what can only be characterized as “naked class warfare,” during the “June Days” the government sent in the military, killing 1500 insurgents and suppressing the workers movement.¹²

Into this context of class warfare and social division stepped the exile Louis Napoleon. Thanks to his adept political skill, populist appeal, and plain name-recognition, he was able to win the loyalty of the peasants and was elected President in December 1848. From this position he accrued power until he staged a coup in 1851 and ultimately became Emperor in 1852.¹³

But who was Napoleon III? He was vilified by Victor Hugo as “a rascal” and by Karl Marx as a “farce” who made the French state “loathsome and ridiculous.”¹⁴ For many years historians agreed, interpreting the Emperor as either a reckless adventurer or a crowned crook.¹⁵ However, most present-day historians reject these crude stereotypes and give proper consideration to the Emperor’s political views. Fundamentally, Napoleon

9 Jordan, *Transforming Paris*, pp. 80-81.

10 W.H.C. Smith, *Second Empire and Commune: France 1848-1871*, 2nd edition, (London: Wayland, 1972), p. 15; Jordan, *Transforming Paris*, pp. 91-92; David Harvey, *Consciousness and the Urban Experience: Studies in the History and Theory of Capitalist Urbanization*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), p. 181.

11 Harvey, *Consciousness*, p. 207.

12 McMillan, *Napoleon III*, p. 31.

13 *Ibid.*, pp. 33, 46, 51.

14 Victor Hugo, “Napoleon the Little,” in *Napoleon III: Buffoon, Modern Dictator, or Sphinx*, ed. Samuel M. Osgood (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1963), p.5; Karl Marx, “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,” in *Napoleon III: Buffoon, Modern Dictator, or Sphinx*, ed. Samuel M. Osgood (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1963), pp. 23, 33.

15 Alain Plessis, *The Rise and Fall of the Second Empire, 1852-1871*, trans. Jonathan Mandelbaum, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 5.

III was a supporter of progress who wanted to use the power of the state to promote economic development for the benefit of all.¹⁶ As he made clear in a speech in 1852 at Bordeaux, his ultimate priority as Emperor was making “conquests” of the internal space of France by infrastructure improvements.¹⁷

His political motto was “March at the head of your century, and its ideas will follow and support you,” and the Emperor aimed to address the 19th century’s challenges head on.¹⁸ Rejecting the bourgeois liberal belief in laissez-faire principles, Napoleon III argued that the state was not “a necessary ulcer” but “...rather the beneficent motive force of every social organism.”¹⁹ Moreover, he followed in the steps of his uncle Napoleon I in trying to bridge the social divide between defenders of ancien regime and advocates of revolution by pursuing social progress while restoring order.²⁰ As his proclamation following his 1851 coup d’état explained, he aimed “to bring the age of revolutions to a close by satisfying the legitimate needs of the people.”²¹

In practice, this meant that Napoleon III needed to win the support of the working class while avoiding alienating the bourgeoisie. As he wrote in 1852, his fundamental aim was to “satisfy the interests of the most numerous classes and win over the upper classes.”²² The need to avoid estranging the bourgeoisie often retarded and delayed the implementation of progressive policies that would benefit workers.²³ Nevertheless, his support for the workers remained strong. Speaking to a worker’s delegation at the start of his reign, he insisted that “those who work and those who suffer can count on me.”²⁴ His desire to win mass support certainly had political motivations, as upon his accession to power he had no friends among the French political elite.²⁵ But concern for the poor was personal, not just political. As Louis Napoleon wrote to an intimate before his rise to power, “I often think of society’s duty toward the disinherited...I shall

16 Plessis, *Rise*, p. 9; McMillan, *Napoleon III*, pp. 136, 142.

17 Chapman and Chapman, *Life and Times*, p. 52.

18 McMillan, *Napoleon III*, p. 15.

19 David H. Pinkney, *Napoleon III and the Rebuilding of Paris*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), p. 38.

20 Roger L. Williams, *The French Revolution of 1870-1871*, (Norton: New York, 1969), p. 3.

21 Plessis, *Rise*, p. 9.

22 *Ibid.*, p. 56.

23 *Ibid.*, *Rise*, p. 56.

24 McMillan, *Napoleon III*, p. 142.

25 *Ibid.*, p. 35

not fail to try to correct this wrong.”²⁶ While he believed in order, he was insistent that only reforms to bring social justice could prevent class warfare and the polarisation of society between revolutionaries and reactionaries.²⁷ Indeed, while Napoleon’s economic policies were remarkably eclectic, the common thread was the attempt to improve the material welfare of the masses.²⁸

In order to see Napoleon III’s views on the working class in action, there is no better place to turn to than the rebuilding of Paris. As David Jordan notes, “[t]he transformation of Paris was the centerpiece of imperial politics and the one policy Napoleon pursued relentlessly.”²⁹ Paris was a high priority for a number of reasons. First, rebuilding Paris was a way to heal the wounds of the class warfare of the Second Republic. Success in Paris would demonstrate that the Empire could solve the problems of urbanization and provide the benefits that previous regimes had failed to bring.³⁰ Indeed, in the early 1850s Paris was plagued by economic distress and unemployment that had been an underlying cause of insurrection. Through government spending on building projects, Napoleon III hoped to end the recession, restore full employment, and win the loyalty of Parisians.³¹ Second, thanks to the June Days, preventing insurrection and securing the capital was critical to the survival of the Second Empire.³² Indeed, between 1826 and 1851, barricades had been thrown up on nine separate occasions in Paris, thrice leading to a revolution.³³ Moreover, concern for security and efforts to improve the welfare of the working class were linked. As the Emperor said, “I would rather face a hostile army of 200,000 than the threat of insurrection founded on unemployment.”³⁴

For the Second Empire, as Haussmann wrote, “The order of this Queen-city [Paris] is one of the main pre-conditions of general security.”³⁵ The hotbeds of insurrection were the densely-packed impenetrable

26 Hendrik Nicolass Boon, “The Social and Economic Policies of Napoleon III,” in *Napoleon III: Buffoon, Modern Dictator, or Sphinx*, ed. Samuel M. Osgood (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1963), p. 43.

27 W.H.C. Smith, *Napoleon III*, (London: Wayland, 1972), p. 114.

28 Plessis, *Rise*, p. 10.

29 Jordan, *Transforming Paris*, p. 177.

30 *Ibid.*, p. 185; Pinkney, *Napoleon III*, p. 50; Chapman and Chapman, *Life and Times*, p. 164.

31 Pinkney, *Napoleon III*, p. 37.

32 Jordan, *Transforming Paris*, p. 109; Pinkney, *Napoleon III*, p. 36.

33 Pinkney, *Napoleon III*, p. 36; Scott, *Seeing*, p. 61.

34 Harvey, *Consciousness*, p. 98.

35 Scott, *Seeing*, p. 61.

workers' districts in eastern Paris with their undecipherable networks of narrow medieval streets ideal for barricades.³⁶ Moreover, these districts were perilously close to key government buildings.³⁷ Napoleon III and Haussmann sought to break up these quarters by constructing a network of broad, paved thoroughfares across the city.³⁸ These thoroughfares were difficult to barricade, provided perfect avenues for artillery fire and cavalry charges, and allowed the movement of troops from their barracks on the outskirts into the heart of the revolutionary districts.³⁹ Moreover, the construction of the roads and the rebuilding program isolated the quarters from each other, made them legible to government surveillance, and in some cases cleared the slums altogether.⁴⁰

But how successful was the rebuilding program in bringing about greater security? After all, while Haussmann certainly cleared some existing slums, the expelled residents set up new slums on the outskirts of Paris. Haussmann had removed one threat only to create another.⁴¹ As one contemporary observer wrote, Haussmann's Paris was "the city of luxury surrounded, blocked by the city of poverty." This was an obviously dangerous situation.⁴² Indeed, the new slums were just as illegible and impenetrable as the past ones.⁴³ Moreover, the avenues and barracks did not prevent the Communards from carrying out prolonged resistance to the Versaillais forces in 1871, leading many to question their utility.⁴⁴

Despite these drawbacks, the rebuilding program clearly improved the security of Paris. The paved boulevards made the erection of barricades much more difficult for the Communards. Moreover, they allowed the Versaillais to penetrate into the insurrectionary districts, thus denying the Communards any ultimate chance of success.⁴⁵ For instance, Haussmann's road links allowed the Versailles army to move quickly and directly into the heart of the Belleville insurrectionary district in 1871.⁴⁶ Indeed, the Commune itself was largely possible thanks to the collapse of the imperial

36 Scott, *Seeing*, p. 61.

37 Chapman and Chapman, *Life and Times*, p. 184.

38 Anthony M. Tung, *Preserving the World's Great Cities: The Destruction and Renewal of the Historic Metropolis*, (New York: Clarkson Potter, 2001), p. 294.

39 Pinkney, *Napoleon III*, p. 72; Plessis, *Rise*, p. 121; Jordan, *Transforming Paris*, p. 188.

40 Jordan, *Transforming Paris*, pp. 188, 292; Scott, *Seeing*, p. 61.

41 *Ibid.*, p. 248.

42 Lazare, quoted in Plessis, *Rise*, p. 124.

43 Scott, *Seeing*, p. 63.

44 Jordan, *Transforming Paris*, p. 191.

45 Pinkney, *Napoleon III*, p. 214.

46 Scott, *Napoleon III*, p. 214.

regime and its security apparatus in 1870 and the cutting off of Paris from government control by Bismarck's armies during the Franco-Prussian War.⁴⁷ The most telling testaments to the success of the rebuilding are that there were no street riots in Paris during the Second Empire and that no French government has ever been toppled by a Parisian insurrection since 1870.⁴⁸

Though security was obviously an important aim, its significance should not be exaggerated. It is erroneous to conclude that Paris was re-planned for strictly strategic purposes, since many roads overlapped and scarcely more than a few roads were planned with strictly strategic aims.⁴⁹ Indeed, Napoleon III's general aim to win the loyalty of the working class was applied in specific ways to the rebuilding of Paris. First, the Emperor and Haussmann were anxious to destroy the crowded slums and improve living conditions of the workers.⁵⁰ Second, they were anxious to grow the economy via government spending on building programs. According to the theory of productive spending, this would stimulate economic growth and provide full employment, because, as a popular contemporary saying went, "When building flourishes, everything flourishes in Paris."⁵¹ Third, the Emperor was very concerned to improve public health so as to prevent cholera epidemics and other diseases that had flourished in the crowded filthy medieval city.⁵² Finally, Napoleon and Haussmann were conscious of the need to build new infrastructure and housing to meet the needs of a rapidly growing Parisian population.⁵³ Otherwise, increasing immigration from the provinces to the capital would lead to overcrowding and a breakdown of basic services.⁵⁴

Many charge that the rebuilding of Paris was of little benefit to workers and in many cases quite harmful. For instance, David Jordan charges that "Imperial urban politics was to contain the working-class quarters, not transform them," emphasizing that the rebuilding program had not so much "ameliorated misery as displaced it."⁵⁵ Haussmann's urban planning is thus seen as a product of his class background and elite

47 Plessis, *Rise*, pp. 170-171.

48 Pinkney, *Napoleon III*, pp. 38, 214.

49 Chapman and Chapman, *Life and Times*, pp. 184-186.

50 Pinkney, *Napoleon III*, p. 93

51 Chapman and Chapman, *Life and Times*, pp. 70-71; Pinkney, *Napoleon III*, p.

37.

52 Pinkney, *Napoleon III*, pp. 9-10, 23, 39, 219.

53 Chapman and Chapman, *Life and Times*, p. 247; Jordan, *Transforming Paris*, pp. 93-97; Pinkney, *Napoleon III*, p. 24.

54 Jordan, *Transforming Paris*, pp. 95-96.

55 *Ibid.*, pp. 191. 354.

worldview, especially since he funneled money and public works into the bourgeois neighbourhoods in western Paris while neglecting the proletarian east.⁵⁶

There is much truth to Jordan's line of criticism. Demolitions and slum clearing expelled workers from their homes in the centre of the city, driving them further and further away into smaller lodgings and forcing them into lengthy commutes.⁵⁷ Building regulations insisted on beautiful facades but allowed contractors to create crowded and airless tenements on the inside.⁵⁸ Likewise, Haussmann failed to keep public works and services in working class areas at pace with their rapid population growth.⁵⁹ While the central business district and glorious cultural life of the Second Empire flourished downtown, workers were pushed into the periphery of the city and the gulf between rich and poor widened.⁶⁰ As one observer said of Haussmann's Paris, "You have exposed every kind of seduction to every kind of envy."⁶¹ Workers clearly resented the crumbs they were given in comparison to the luxurious bourgeois lifestyle visible downtown.⁶²

The program delivered real benefits to workers. First and most importantly, the construction program provided jobs for one-fifth of Paris' workers throughout the Second Empire.⁶³ Moreover, while public works and welfare in working class areas did not expand as fast as needed to keep up with demand, they nonetheless grew significantly. Spending on welfare and education in working-class areas increased markedly under Haussmann.⁶⁴ Also, he built and improved public hospitals and established convalescent homes outside of Paris to care for workers.⁶⁵ While Parisians often failed to appreciate Haussmann's health and sanitation measures such as improved water treatment, new sewers, and aqueducts, these measures undeniably succeeded in reducing death rates and eliminating cholera.⁶⁶

Historians of the Second Empire James McMillan, W.H.C. Smith, and Alain Plessis are all agreed that the rebuilding of Paris was a political failure for Napoleon III in that it failed to win the loyalty of the working

56 Jordan, *Transforming Paris*, pp. 247-248.

57 Plessis, *Rise*, p. 124.

58 Pinkney, *Napoleon III*, p. 93.

59 *Ibid.*, p. 166.

60 McMillan, *Napoleon III*, p. 143; Smith, *Second Empire*, p. 74.

61 Lazare, quoted in Plessis, *Rise*, p. 124

62 Williams, *French Revolution*, p. 27.

63 Tung, *Preserving*, p. 294.

64 Chapman and Chapman, *Life and Times*, pp. 122-123.

65 *Ibid.*, pp. 123-124.

66 Pinkney, *Napoleon III*, pp. 150, 219.

class.⁶⁷ Workers consistently preferred the socialist brand of republicanism to the Second Empire, and were angered by their expulsion from the centre city and the widening gap between rich and poor. At the same time, workers preferred the Second Empire to bourgeois political republicanism because they recognized that though the Imperial government did not always protect their interests, bourgeois republicans were consistently opposed to the interests of workers.⁶⁸ Over and over again, Napoleon III and Haussmann took steps that benefitted workers during the rebuilding of Paris, steps that large elements of the bourgeoisie opposed.⁶⁹ The bourgeoisie was horrified by the theory of productive spending and the government decision to take on the debt that underlay the whole building program and the jobs it provided to workers.⁷⁰ Both the Church and bourgeois anti-clericals criticized Haussmann's welfare programs for usurping the role of private charity.⁷¹ Elements of the bourgeoisie, terrified of the influx of workers to Paris, blamed Haussmann's public works programs for attracting more people to the city.⁷² Indeed, they favoured cutting back public works and welfare in order to discourage migrants from coming to Paris.⁷³

There are signs that workers appreciated the rebuilding of Paris and were upset at the end of large-scale public works programs and the dismissal of Haussmann in January 1870. For instance, throughout the Second Empire migrant workers from rural France encouraged their friends and relatives to come to Paris, praising the abundant jobs, decent wages, and beauty of the city.⁷⁴ Moreover, when public works lagged in 1868 and the following years as the bourgeois critics of Haussmann's unorthodox financial methods gained ascendancy, unemployed construction labourers became increasingly radicalized.⁷⁵ By the spring of 1870 there were large-scale protests by construction workers for a resumption of public works.⁷⁶ Indeed, a disproportionately large number of Communards were construction workers, suggesting that worker dissatisfaction with the end

67 McMillan, Napoleon III, p. 143; Smith, Second Empire, p. 74; Plessis, Rise, p. 124.

68 Harvey, *Consciousness*, pp. 207, 209.

69 Jordan, *Transforming Paris*, p. 177.

70 *Ibid.*, p. 230.

71 Chapman and Chapman, *Life and Times*, p. 124.

72 Pinkney, Napoleon III, p. 155.

73 Chapman and Chapman, *Life and Times*, p. 90.

74 Pinkney, Napoleon III, pp. 160-161.

75 Harvey, *Consciousness*, p. 99.

76 Pinkney, Napoleon III, pp. 208-209.

of the rebuilding program was actually a major contributing cause of the Commune.⁷⁷

For many scholars the Commune marks the ultimate failure of Napoleon III's rebuilding of Paris. For instance, Jordan argues that the Commune represented the reclaiming of Paris by the dispossessed workers from capitalist exploitation and imperial tyranny, while Marx maintained that the "direct antithesis of the Empire was the Commune."⁷⁸ Clearly, the Commune demonstrated that Napoleon III had failed to heal the wounds of class warfare as he had set out to do. Still, the Emperor deserves credit for benefiting the working class through the rebuilding program and preventing the class hatred between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat from erupting into bloodshed on the streets of Paris during his reign. It is noteworthy that the bloody Commune with its showdown between the workers of Paris and the conservative bourgeoisie only occurred after Napoleon III, who had attempted to work with both classes, had been removed from the picture by the Franco-Prussian War. Historian Sir Denis Brogan remarked that Adolphe Thiers' repression of the Communards "[made] final that alienation of the workers of Paris from the organization of the French State which the days of June 1848 had begun."⁷⁹ While Napoleon III aimed to better the existence of workers, Thiers established the Third Republic by the execution of more than 20,000 Communards in an orgy of brutality.⁸⁰

In conclusion, with regard to the working class the rebuilding of Paris had mixed results. Napoleon III and Haussmann set out both to secure Paris against insurrection and to heal the wounds of the Second Republic by winning the loyalty of the working class through jobs and improvements. In the realm of security, the rebuilding program did not stop the Communards from seizing the city or setting up barricades, but it both prevented street riots during the Second Empire and allowed the Versaillais to penetrate into the heart of insurgent districts to crush the Communards. Likewise, while the program failed to win the loyalty of Paris's workers, it at least gave them some benefits and kept the class hatred between workers and bourgeois from breaking out into open war on the streets of Paris during the Second Empire.

77 Harvey, *Consciousness*, p. 99.

78 Jordan, *Transforming Paris*, p. 343; Marx quoted in Plessis, *Rise*, p. 170.

79 Quoted in Williams, *French Revolution*, p. 114.

80 Smith, *Napoleon III*, p. 264.

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was established, the colonial administration viewed Laos as little more than blank space and frontier zone, leaving the area underdeveloped and encouraging Vietnamese settlement. Even when the French began to encourage the growth of Lao nationalism in the 1930s and 1940s, the idea of a Laotian identity was explicitly directed against Siam/Thailand, underlining the root causes behind French involvement.

The image of the Mekong River as grand trade route linking Southeast Asia to the untold riches of China inspired early French moves into Indochina in general, not just Laos. Fantasies of trade up the Mekong presented a chance for France to catch up with other European colonial powers, namely the British. When the French Navy captured Saigon in 1862, the city's principal asset was considered to be its position near the Mekong River Delta. Cochinchina and the Mekong were seen as backdoors into China, where Britain already had a head start in the form of Hong Kong. As France absorbed Cochinchina expansionist Navy Minister Prosper de Chasseloup-Laubat celebrated Saigon's "splendid" location, though he negatively compared its overall potential to that of British Singapore and the shared European port of Shanghai.¹ Nevertheless, Chasseloup-Laubat's identification of Saigon's perceived competitors spoke to the economic level the French wanted the city to operate at.

Unfortunately for France, it would soon become apparent that the Mekong River was not suitable for high-volume trade. The 1866 Mekong expedition led by Doudart de Lagrée and Francis Garnier managed to reach China, but along the way discovered numerous rapids and shallow areas that would make it impossible for large vessels to travel all the way up the river.² French colonial attention drifted away from Cochinchina, Cambodia, and Laos to areas further north along the Vietnamese coast, hoping that Tonkin's Red River might provide a more viable route into China.³ The background of early French interest in the Mekong shows how territorial claims were calculated as part of broader colonial and economic competition across Asia, while the fact that France only occupied Laos after the river had been proven difficult to navigate reveals the importance of political factors in its acquisition.

1 Søren Ivarsson, *Creating Laos: The Making of a Lao Space between Indochina and Siam, 1860-1945* (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2008), 30. For the transliteration of Lao names, I have followed Ivarsson's standard.

2 Ibid., 31.

3 Ibid., 32.

It was not until the 1880s that France began making tentative moves into Laos again, and by that time the political context had changed in Europe, making the government amenable to accumulating territory. In 1871, France had been shocked by its unexpected loss of the Franco-Prussian War. Alsace-Lorraine's industrial areas and coal resources were lost to Germany, damaging France's economy and international stature.⁴ After about a decade of moderate recovery, the French government seized upon overseas expansion as way to regain lost glory and improve the country's economy without risking open conflict in Europe.⁵ Adjacent to France's pre-existent holdings in Indochina, areas along the Mekong presented a logical site for a new colony. However, with the myth of the Mekong disproved, France's attraction to the territories that would constitute Laos was not grounded in the area's specific features. In fact, the real prize many French pundits had in mind was Siamese land to the west of the Mekong, far more prosperous than the weak and sparsely populated Lao kingdoms closer to Vietnam.⁶ August Pavie, French vice-consul to Luang Phrabang in the late 1880s and after 1893 the first Commissioner-General of French Laos, advocated this view of Laos as a stepping stone.⁷ Even in a political climate that encouraged the extension of France's colonial borders, the greater strategic implications of possessing Laos were coveted more than the place itself.

For the French one of the crucial strategic advantages of controlling Laos was assurance against British encroachment on Indochina. By the 1850s, the British already ruled a large portion of southern Burma, and they would steadily move north throughout the rest of the century. There were worries that the British might move into Siam, the area around Chiang Mai, or even up to the Mekong, bringing British India into Indochina's backyard.⁸ By 1884 France had obtained the new colonial possessions of Annam and Tonkin, and required either a hard border or buffer zone to shield their western edge. Cambodia already guarded Cochinchina's flank in this manner, but more territory was needed to seal off France's new holdings.

Though grounded in local conditions, these French anxieties

4 Ivarsson, "Creating Laos," 32.

5 Ibid., 33.

6 Martin Stuart-Fox, *A History of Laos* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1893), 20.

7 Ibid.

8 Ivarsson, "Creating Laos," 33.

over Britain's presence in the region were linked back to European rivalries often played out more through optics and metaphorical displays of power than real trade competition or armed conflict. In 1886 Britain sent a consul to Chiang Mai, causing the French to respond by making Pavie their first vice-consul to Luang Phrabang, one of the many kingdoms created by the collapse of more the powerful Lao kingdom of Lan Xang centuries earlier.⁹ Since Luang Phrabang paid tribute to Siam, the French had to negotiate to place Pavie there, a step that implicitly recognized Siamese influence east of the Mekong, but also granted France their first definitive steps into Laos. It took until 1887 for Pavie to get to his posting, but once there he proved very useful, saving Luang Phrabang's King Unkham from a marauding army of local Ho Chinese. Since Siamese officials stationed in the city had failed to help the king, the French were able to present the narrative of Pavie gaining Lao trust.¹⁰ As thanks, King Unkham requested association with France rather than Siam.¹¹ Although the next stages of France's conquest of Laos would mainly involve clashes and negotiations with Siam, it should be remembered that Pavie had ended up in Luang Phrahang because of the British.

Frictions between Britain and France were most visible in relation to the small principality of Chiang Khaeng, located on both banks of the Mekong near the amorphous intersection of Burma, Siam, China, and Laos.¹² Although the situation did not come to a head until a few years after France obtained most of Laos in a coercive 1893 treaty with Siam, tensions had been developing since a few years prior, illustrating how Britain's presence galvanized French efforts to secure Laos. In 1890, Britain consolidated its rule in the Shan States, Burma's rough and remote northeastern edge.¹³ As a Shan tributary, Chiang Khaeng and its capital Mueang Sing now fell into Britain's sphere of influence. Yet the principality also paid tribute to Siam, and had historically done the same for the Chinese court.¹⁴ Matters got more complicated in 1893, when Siam ceded France the entire east bank of

9 Stuart-Fox, "A History of Laos," 22.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Volker Grabowsky, "Chiang Khaeng 1893-1896: A Lue Principality in the Upper Mekong Valley at the Centre of Franco-British Rivalry," in *Contesting Visions of the Lao Past*, ed. Christopher E. Goscha and Søren Ivarsson, 37-70 (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2003), 35.

13 Ibid., 47.

14 Ibid., 46, 52.

the Mekong.¹⁵ Mueang Sing was east of the river, throwing British plans into disarray. Both Britain and France desired Chiang Khaeng for its proximity to China, Britain eying the nearby Chinese tributary of Sipsong Panna in particular.¹⁶ Conflict loomed, and there was fear that a clash over Chiang Khaeng could quickly spread to a wider scale, perhaps even to Europe.¹⁷

Britain's proposed solution was to create a buffer state between its territories and France's. However, France did not take too kindly to the suggestion. Although the British Foreign Secretary and French Foreign Minister signed an agreement a few months before France formally gained Laos, proposing the creation of an "independent territory" between their countries' possessions in the Upper Mekong, the French government was reluctant to put the plan into action.¹⁸ Britain wanted to keep its territories west of the Mekong river, using the eastern half of Chiang Khaeng as the buffer state. The French public perceived this as an effort to separate their empire from Chinese markets, and the French government declined the proposal.¹⁹ There was discussion of a buffer state including land on both sides of the river, but France vacillated. In 1895, British Gurkha troops simply crossed the Mekong and took control of Mueang Sing without a fight.²⁰ However, France had gained the support of the local elite, who made life difficult for the occupiers.²¹ After a year, the British withdrew and re-negotiated with France, finally setting a border along the Mekong.²² Perhaps not surprisingly, Mueang Sing reverted to its minor, obscure status after the near-confrontation ended. Following 1904's Entente Cordiale there was no more serious colonial competition between Britain and France, and one of the important causes behind the annexation of Laos fading away.²³ However, the Mueang Sing incident remains significant for how it highlighted the complex web of tributary relationships in place throughout much of Laos, how France saw Laos in the context of broader colonial competition, and — considering the ultimate division of Chiang Khaeng

15 Grabowsky, 49.

16 Ibid., 47.

17 Peter Simms and Sanda Simms, *The Kingdoms of Laos: Six Hundred Years of History* (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1999), 208.

18 Grabowsky, 49.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid, 50.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.

23 Stuart Fox, 26.

across the Mekong — the sheer arbitrariness of French colonial space in Laos.

Siam's claims to Laos were more justifiable, durable, and insistent than Britain's, and the possibility that they might formalize their loose traditional power in the area was a major impetus for French colonization. The Thai and Lao are both Tai peoples, sharing ethnolinguistic heritage and the myth of descent from Khun Borom, the legendary first Tai king.²⁴ The aforementioned Lan Xang kingdom arranged around the Mekong had been intermittently powerful from the thirteenth century until the end of the seventeenth century, but afterwards Siam became the dominant power in the region.²⁵ By the 1770s, three medium-sized kingdoms had emerged from the unraveling of Lan Xang: Vientiane, Champassack, and the previously noted kingdom of Luang Phrabang. All three were tributaries of Siam, but they also occasionally paid tribute to the Annamese court in Hue.²⁶ In early nineteenth century, European writing on Siam referenced areas along the Mekong as well, displaying a lack of distinction between territories that would later constitute two states.²⁷ Despite a perception that these areas and others were within a Siamese sphere of influence, European powers were willing and able to gradually accumulate Siam's vassal states, as Bangkok did not exercise strong political control. The Laotian kingdoms were not linked to a modern Siamese state structure but rather a "mandala" tributary system, where limited autonomy could coexist with malleable allegiances to multiple powers.²⁸ Such a system made it possible for France to insidiously layer its influence over Siam's, but it left borders undefined, a confusing situation for a European power used to thinking as a strictly defined nation-state. Still, France would only begin to see complete control of Laos as necessary when Siam began to modernize itself and mark its own borders.

Confronted by France in the 1880s, Siam's attitude towards its tributaries and frontier areas changed. In the words of Thai historian Thongchai Winichakul, "for Siam now, every bit of soil was desirable not so much for its economic value but because of its meaning to sovereignty, royal dignity, and nationhood."²⁹ This was a modern attitude

24 Stuart Fox., 12.

25 Ibid., 14

26 Ibid., 14.

27 Ibid., 31.

28 Ibid., 26.

29 Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press,

that mirrored France's own justifications for involvement in Laos. For Siam, "only a modern map could make an argument" against the French.³⁰ In 1884 Siam's King Chulalongkorn commissioned British geographer James McCarthy to map Siam's precarious possessions east of the Mekong.³¹ By 1888 McCarthy's expeditions had produced a map representing all of present-day Laos as part of Siam.³² Simultaneously the French also carried out exploration and mapping of the Upper Mekong region, hoping to cement their own claims before Siam could.³³ The French occasionally discovered border posts along Siam's proposed boundary, which they "kicked over" to negate their competitor's claims.³⁴ Siam had posted commissioners in Luang Phrabang and Xiengkhuang in 1886, and in the same year announced plans for Royal Thai Post Offices in Luang Phrabang.³⁵ Without French action, Laos could have very easily been incorporated into modern Siam.

By reforming, Siam became a potent risk for French Indochina. Though fluid and quite vague, Siamese claims extended almost all the way to Vietnam, the government placing troops "on the crest of the cordillera, virtually overlooking the plains of Annam."³⁶ Though a violent clash was avoided, Siamese and French troops had a tense encounter in Thaeng (today Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam) in 1888, the extremely eastern location illustrating the extent of Siam's territorial claims.³⁷ Closer to Siam's central Chao Praya River, the government proved how simple it was to tie ethnic Lao into their modern state. A French observer present in Ubon (a city in the Khorat Plateau southwest of the Mekong) from 1887-1888 noted how local Lao were made to participate in ceremonies honoring the King of Siam. Photographs of the king were prominently displayed, and leaders from across the Mekong would visit twice a year to pay tribute before a picture of the king.³⁸ Today the Khorat Plateau constitutes Thailand's northeastern region of Isan, which despite a strong local identity based around ethnic

1994), 111.

30 Ibid., 121.

31 Ivarsson, 35.

32 Thongchai, "Siam Mapped," 125.

33 Stuart-Fox, 23.

34 Ivarsson, 36.

35 Ibid.

36 Thongchai, 109.

37 Ibid., 100.

38 Ivarsson 36.

Lao heritage and rural poverty, firmly remains part of the country.³⁹ By the 1890s, Siam was starting to assert itself geographically, militarily, and culturally, disconcertingly close to France's colonies. In the estimation of Jules Harmand, French consul in Bangkok in the early 1880s, France required "a scientific frontier" in the region.⁴⁰

This frontier would be achieved through a brief conflict and manipulative treaty with Siam in 1893. Siam refused to budge as France attempted to lay claims to various territories east of the Mekong. Tensions rose over minor incidents, such as the ejection of French merchants from Siamese-controlled areas, and limited fighting broke out. As tensions rose, the British sent three ships to the entrance of Chao Praya River, waiting in case it became necessary to rescue British citizens from Bangkok.⁴¹ France subsequently sent two ships, which continued upriver without permission. When fired at by a Siamese fort, the ships responded and sailed upriver to Bangkok, essentially laying the capital under siege.⁴² A few months later, on October 3, the Siamese signed a treaty granting France the entire east bank of the Mekong.⁴³

The terms of the treaty illustrated French perceptions of Laos: the new possession was "considered a geographical and not political entity."⁴⁴ The protectorate of Laos was more a spatially expedient extension of colonial boundaries than a distinct and contained state temporarily under French control. While Laos would eventually be positioned as a successor to Lan Xang, it left vast predominately-Lao areas in Siamese hands. Even though it could have been comparatively straightforward to obtain the Khorat Plateau and other Lao territories, after 1893 France lost interest in crossing the Mekong.⁴⁵ This attitude betrayed a view of Laos as simply a collection of convenient territories, rather than a historic state that France was trying to protect and civilize, as colonial discourses occasionally suggested. As for the economic potential of the area, Martin Stuart-Fox writes of a "widespread belief

39 Mayoury Ngaosyvathn and Pheupanh Ngaosyvathn, *Kith and Kin Politics: The Relationship Between Laos and Thailand* (Manila: Journal of Contemporary Asia Publishers, 1994), 48.

40 Cited in Christopher E. Goscha, *Vietnam or Indochina: Contesting Concepts of Space in Vietnamese Nationalism, 1887-1954* (Copenhagen: NIAS Publishing, 1995). Italics are Harmand's own.

41 Stuart-Fox, 25.

42 Ibid.

43 Simms and Simms, 210.

44 Ivarsson, 40.

45 Stuart-Fox, 27.

that this must be a land of rich resources” despite no strong supporting evidence.⁴⁶ There were hopes that the Mekong could still become a major artery for trade if abetted by road and railway links.⁴⁷ In general though, it was seen as an almost empty space, requiring Vietnamese settlement and integration with the rest of Indochina to become profitable.⁴⁸

The manner in which the French ruled Laos demonstrated an indifference to the colony beyond its role as a boundary. Despite pretensions of a civilizing mission, the French enacted little meaningful development, and presented Laos as a new frontier for Vietnamese settlement rather than a unique space in its own right. In the Vietnamese protectorates of Indochina, France helped create some heavy industry, but the closest Laos came to industrialization under French rule was a brief tin mining boom in the 1920s, which primarily employed Vietnamese in any case.⁴⁹ Even with political control, it proved difficult for the French to step into Laotian markets, as trade routes traditionally linked the Mekong region to Bangkok rather than Saigon, and the Chinese business community controlled most internal trade.⁵⁰ The building of railways had the potential to increase Laos’ importance and upend old commercial patterns, but reliable modern transport links to the rest of Indochina only really arrived in the 1940s, in the twilight of French colonialism.⁵¹

Despite these efforts, as well as extensive taxation and government monopolies on alcohol, salt, and opium, Laos was not a profitable colony for France, and the administration always required financial help from the metropole.⁵² Admittedly, after a few years of French rule it could have been argued that the civilizing mission was going well, with some roads built, taxation imposed, local slavery ended, and a handful of Catholic converts won.⁵³ Yet French control remained tenuous. In the 1910s uprisings broke out around the protectorate, including in Mueang Sing, which despite the earlier squabbles with the British only came under full French rule in 1904.⁵⁴

46 Stuart-Fox., 28.

47 Ibid., 47.

48 Ibid., 46.

49 Ibid., 50.

50 Ibid., 46.

51 Goscha, 76.

52 Stuart-Fox, 32.

53 Ibid., 33.

54 Ibid., 37.

The various rebellions were eventually suppressed, but France's actual presence in the colony remained quite minimal. It is estimated that the highest number of Europeans ever in colonial Laos was around a thousand, a figure that points to a lack of interest and a dearth of economic opportunities.⁵⁵ While some physical infrastructure was built, France did not go very far in creating local institutions. There was no official legal system for the first 30 years of French rule.⁵⁶ Education was only sparingly developed, demonstrating a lack of meaningful commitment on France's part. Indicatively, education wasn't listed by itself on Laos' budget until 1905.⁵⁷ When it arrived, in the shape of the Reformed Pagoda Schools that grew exponentially in number during the second half of the 1920s, curriculums only addressed the Lao language, Buddhism, and history.⁵⁸ By contrast, schools in Vietnam were far more modern and presented opportunities for further study or jobs in the bureaucracy. With little use found for Laos beyond its strategic position, the French would look to give it new shape by bringing in Vietnamese settlers.

France's encouragement of Vietnamese migration into Laos expressed both a view of the colony as little more than a blank frontier space, and continued anxiety over the threat of Siam. French opinion held the Vietnamese, or Annamese as they were called prior to independence, as somehow more vital than the Khmer or Lao. Jean Baptiste Paul Beau, Governor General from 1902 to 1908, deemed the Vietnamese the only ethnic group "capable of opposing" the Thai. They could be used to "smash the this effort towards a unity of the Thai race before it can be realized."⁵⁹ Harmand, in his account of travels through Laos into Annam in 1877, expressed his joy at entering extensively farmed Annamese land after a sojourn in dense Laotian forests barely touched by human cultivation ("...une terre sauvage, couvert de forêts, à peine déflorée par le travail de l'homme").⁶⁰ The Lao were considered mild and friendly but basically weak, requiring French (and therefore Vietnamese) help to survive in the face of Siam.

Looking back to their conquest of Laos as a solid border, the French had always viewed it as an extension of Vietnamese space. In the 1880s they tried to substantiate their claims on Laos by looking

55 Stuart-Fox, 42

56 Ibid., 43.

57 Ibid.

58 Goscha, 77.

59 Goscha, 18.

60 Jules Harmand, *L'Homme du Mékong* (Paris: Editions Phébus, 1994), 237.

through imperial archives in Hue, searching for records listing it as part of Annam.⁶¹ Since the agreements establishing French rule over Annam and Tonkin included commitments to protect other Vietnamese holdings, the discovery of imperial records on tribute from Lao kingdoms provided some justification for colonial expansion.⁶² Thus, Laos was seen as a Vietnamese territory that the Siamese were unjustly encroaching on. By this logic, bringing Vietnamese into Laos would restore a historical relationship while developing the colony and protecting it from Siam. Vietnamese workers, bureaucrats, and farmers flooded into the protectorate.⁶³ In the late 1930s Vietnamese comprised around 2 per cent of Laos's total population, recorded in 1936 as just over a million.⁶⁴ While this did not represent a huge number of people, the Vietnamese were receiving preferential treatment, already in the early 1930s holding 54 per cent of the administration posts available for Indochinese.⁶⁵ In addition, the majority of urban residents were Vietnamese.⁶⁶ Beyond illustrating how French concepts of a greater Indochina often only benefited ethnic Vietnamese, the belief that migrants could easily fill empty, undeveloped space and revitalize Laos also demonstrated that France often viewed the area as little more than a void along Indochina's border.

The French, however, did eventually begin to support the growth of Lao nationalism. Though somewhat contradictory to their project of Vietnamese migration and the image of Indochina as a complete whole, the purpose behind the promotion of Lao culture and identity looped back to one of France's original goals in the protectorate: to protect their colonies from Siam. The Lao nationalism created was partially directed against Vietnamese domination, but was mostly oppositional towards Siam, which in 1939 renamed itself Thailand. This transformation was particularly dangerous for France, as the new emphasis on a "Thai" race blurred together numerous Tai peoples (including the Lao), implying they all belonged in the modern, ethnically defined state of Thailand.⁶⁷ A few years beforehand, France had already starting cutting remaining links between Siam and Laos. To stop Lao monks from travelling to Bangkok for religious instruction, in 1931 a

61 Ivarsson, 38.

62 Stuart-Fox, 21

63 Goscha, 27.

64 Ibid, 24, Stuart-Fox, 42.

65 Goscha, 24.

66 Stuart-Fox, 51

67 Ivarsson, 70.

Buddhist Institute was started in Vientiane, and Pali schools were created across the colony.⁶⁸ As attempts were made to standardize the Lao language and its writing in the 1930s, special attention was paid to ensure it did not hem too closely to Thai grammar and the Thai alphabet.⁶⁹ It was during the Vichy period, as colonial rule grew increasingly precarious and France fought a brief war with Thailand, that authorities really began to exhort the Lao against Thai “racial imperialism.”⁷⁰ The French established the Lao Propaganda Service, which in 1941 published Laos’ first newspaper, *Lao Nhay*.⁷¹ Written in Lao, the newspaper espoused a view of Laos as a “patrie” or native land, and published satirical cartoons mocking Thailand.⁷² *Lao Nhay* serialized the novel *Khamson and Sisamud*, a sort of Laotian *Tour de France*, in which two Lao orphans traveled the through the colony, as well as into the Khorat Plateau, identifying it as a part of a greater Lao space.⁷³ Articles in *Lao Nhay* helped foster the idea of a Lao revitalization under benevolent French supervision.⁷⁴ Vietnamese were occasionally subject to moderate criticism in the newspaper’s pages, but the Thai were the main ‘Other’ that the Lao ethnicity was defined against. By supporting the articulation of Laotian identity in this manner as French Indochina’s borders grew fragile, the Vichy regime reconfirmed Laos’ original role as bulwark against Thai expansion. France’s client had changed from the Vietnamese to the Lao, but the intention remained the same.

The encouragement of Lao nationalism soon backfired for the French, and they found themselves out of the colony, first when Japan expelled them in March 1945, and then definitively after 1954. But the difficulties independent Laos had defining itself echoed France’s attitude to the territory. Even though the French had helped create the framework of a modern Lao nation, the idea of the state as a home for all Lao did not completely work, considering how many were left behind in northeastern Thailand. French Laos had been an artificial construction. Geographic congruencies with Lan Xang existed, but the colony was conceived first and foremost as a barrier against British and Siamese moves towards the Indochina, the prestige its acquisition granted France coming as an advantageous side effect. The Mekong’s

68 Ivarsson, 123, 125.

69 Ibid., 135.

70 Goscha, 85.

71 Ivarsson, 152.

72 Ibid., 160, 163.

73 Ibid., 162.

74 Ibid., 177.

limited navigability had been discovered more than a decade before the absorption of Laos, meaning the French were well aware the area had scant potential as an important trade route. Instead, they wanted Laos in order to shield the western edge of their Vietnamese protectorates and remain a visible player in global colonial competition. A simultaneous neglect of Laotian development and support for Vietnamese settlement confirmed a French view of the area between the Mekong border and Vietnam as a tabula rasa, still requiring definition. The cultivation of Laotian nationalism contradicted previous events to a degree, but served the same basic goal of blocking Thai aggression. While elsewhere in Indochina the French had arrived earlier, built more, and laid deeper roots, Laos remained a frontier until the end.

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EVALUATING THE TRIED AND TRUE: MORAL ECONOMY AND PROGRESSIVE DEMONSTRATIONS IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND AND FRANCE

BY MIHNEA HORATIU PORIME

On September 22, 1957, the people of Haiti, empowered for the first time by universal suffrage,¹ elected François Duvalier as President. It was a deeply flawed election, with Haiti's military openly interfering for Duvalier's benefit, but scholars agree that the result reflected the opinion of the majority of Haitians.² Over the next few years, Duvalier unleashed violent repression on an unprecedented scale, and by the time of his death in 1971, he had cut deep wounds into the Haitian body politic. Duvalier was not supported by Haitians because he advanced a platform of autocratic dictatorship—in fact, few foresaw Duvalier's violence—but due to what he promised and embodied to Haiti's long-disempowered Black majority, many of whom had been seriously disillusioned by the American occupation of 1915–1934 and the genocide of Haitians in the Dominican Republic in 1937. As a major figure of the mid-twentieth century Black Haitian nationalist movement, Duvalier appeared to many Black Haitians to be a populist who would rejuvenate the country by bringing popular ideas of religion and nation to the forefront of Haitian life. This, coupled with his stated desire to continue to pursue the modest economic and social reforms of his predecessor, Dumarsais Estimé, allowed Duvalier to amass the support required to win the 1957 Haitian election.

Haiti's stark division between a small, wealthy, and usually light-skinned elite and an impoverished Black majority has roots dating back to a time prior to its independence from France in 1804. The class cleavage has its origins in pre-revolutionary French colonial society, in which the vast majority of the island's residents were African slaves, who worked under appalling conditions on sugar plantations. The small number of white colonists were undoubtedly the wealthiest and most influential people in the colony, but a second class, mostly composed of individuals with mixed European-African ancestry (the *gens de couleur*), also had influence. Most of the white population fled the country during the Revolution (1791–1804),³ with the remainder killed on the orders of independent

1 Mark Schuller, "Haiti's 200-Year Ménage-à-Trois: Globalization, the State, and Civil Society," *Caribbean Studies* 35, no. 1 (January–June 2007): 162.

2 Elizabeth Abbott states that "the results represented Haitian majority opinion" on page 75 of *Haiti: The Duvaliers and their Legacy*; David Nicholls writes "it is likely that the victory of Duvalier reflected popular sentiment at the time" on page 1239 of "Haiti: The Rise and Fall of Duvalierism," *Third World Quarterly* 8, no. 4 (October 1986).

3 Jean-Pierre O. Gingras, *Duvalier, Caribbean Cyclone: The History of Haiti and*

Haiti's first ruler, Jean-Jacques Dessalines. In an attempt to unify the African former slaves and the gens de couleur, Dessalines, who was of African origin, declared that all Haitians, regardless of skin colour, would be called "Black".⁴ Dessalines went so far as to force intermarriage between Haitians of African descent and the gens de couleur, who would come to be known as "mulattoes".⁵ However, Dessalines was assassinated in 1806 and no later rulers, black or mulatto, would be so ambitiously conciliatory; the "mulattoes" remained disproportionately wealthy, and Black Haitians remained disproportionately poor. Unresolved tension between the classes would boil over a number of times throughout Haiti's history, and provided some of the basis for Duvalier's rise to power.

Religious differences exacerbated tensions between Haiti's two classes. The mulattoes had a strong connection to the Catholic church, formalized with the 1860 Concordat. According to the terms of the concordat, the church was allowed to independently appoint clergy, and soon staffed the higher ranks of the Haitian church with white European priests.⁶ Many Haitians were distrustful of this arrangement, fearing foreign intervention in their country's affairs.⁷ In Haiti's overwhelmingly Black and mostly poor rural areas, Catholic practices existed alongside vodou, which was diverse and decentralized in stark opposition to the rigid hierarchy of the Catholic church. Though some Haitian rulers at times promoted vodou,⁸ it was illegal for much of Haiti's history and periodically attacked by the Haitian state.⁹ The Catholicism of Haiti's elite remained the sole official religion until 1987,¹⁰ demonstrating that group's hold on power.

The United States occupied Haiti between 1915 and 1934, implementing policies that increased tensions between Haiti's classes and framing the growth of the Afrocentric nationalism that François Duvalier embraced. The occupation began in July 1915, when several hundred United States Marines landed in Haiti to take control of the country amidst the political turmoil that had followed the assassination of President Guillaume Sam.¹¹ After several years of American military rule, Haitian

its Present Government, 22.

4 Gingras, Duvalier, Caribbean Cyclone, 29.

5 Abbott, Haiti, 20.

6 David Nicholls, "Politics and Religion in Haiti" Canadian Journal of Political Science 3, no. 3 (September 1970): 403.

7 Nicholls, "Politics and Religion in Haiti", 403.

8 Nicholls states that Faustin Soulouque (1847–1859) and Antoine Simon (1908–1911) were supporters of vodou on page 403 of "Politics and Religion in Haiti".

9 David Nicholls, "Ideology and Political Protest in Haiti, 1930–46," Journal of Contemporary History 9, no. 4 (October 1974): 12.

10 Paul Christopher Johnson, "Secretism and the Apotheosis of Duvalier," Journal of the American Academy of Religion 74, no. 2 (June 2006): 426.

11 Suzy Castor and Lynn Garafola, "The American Occupation of Haiti (1915–34)

governments were formed and allowed to project a façade of independence while remaining puppets of the American military. These governments were led by mulattoes, a fact that further connected the elite class to foreign interests in the minds of Black Haitian nationalists. Furthermore, the American occupiers could be brutally violent toward the Black Haitians of the countryside: most infamously, in December 1929 Marines dropped bombs into the harbour of the restive town of Les Cayes, triggering riots and the massacre of dozens of Haitians.¹² The association of the mulatto-led governments with American repression and occupation deepened Black Haitians' antipathy toward elites¹³.

When the overwhelmingly white United States Marines arrived in Haiti, their policies, behaviour, and patterns of economic activity reflected the deep-seated hostility toward Black people that permeated American society at the time. The hostility existed at all levels: upon reaching Haiti and being introduced to members of the Haitian elite, Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan is quoted as having remarked, "Dear me, think of it! Niggers speaking French!"¹⁴ Marines and American officials were openly racist toward Haitians of all colours, humiliating and insulting them on a daily basis.¹⁵ Americans drank alcohol and imported light-skinned Dominican women for their brothels and night clubs, horrifying Haitians, who tended to be more socially conservative.¹⁶ Furthermore, the occupiers imported the segregationist Jim Crow laws from the American South to the American-owned establishments that catered to white Marines.¹⁷ This behaviour was humiliating to Black Haitians, but even more so to the mulatto elite that had never before experienced discrimination on the basis of race. Prior to the occupation, many Haitians had understood themselves to be somehow superior to Africans, but first-hand exposure to a racist, imperial power led to an increasing tendency on the part of Black Haitian nationalists to identify with the colonized peoples of Africa.¹⁸ The result was to harden and racialize the attitudes of Black Haitian nationalists and to

and the Dominican Republic (1916-24)," *The Massachusetts Review* 15, no. 1/2 (Winter-Spring 1972): 254.

12 Abbott, *Haiti*, 46.

13 *Ibid.*, 45.

14 Cited by Schuller on page 160 of "Haiti's 200-Year Ménage-à-Trois: Globalization, the State, and Civil Society" in Frantz Douyon's *Haïti – de indépendance à dépendance* and Magdaline W. Shannon's *Jean Price-Mars, the Haitian Elite, and the American Occupation*.

15 Abbott, *Haiti*, 39-40.

16 *Ibid.*, 40.

17 *Ibid.*

18 Martin Munro, "Can't Stand up for Falling down: Haiti, its Revolutions, and Twentieth-Century Negritudes," *Research in African Literatures* 35, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 6.

win more support for the nationalist cause from Haitian mulattoes.

Americans were hostile to the culture of rural Haiti, as well. Vodou was seen as cruel and uncivilized,¹⁹ evidence of Haiti's supposed backwardness. This formed part of the calculation on the part of the United States that Haiti was unable to function in the modern world, from which followed the justification for invasion.²⁰ Unleashed upon rural Haiti, American soldiers targeted vodou as an obstacle to modernization, destroying sacred drums and other objects as they forcibly shut down gatherings.²¹ Many Black intellectuals understood this to be a violent exercise of colonial power and an attack on that which was authentically Haitian.²² Like many Haitian leaders before them, the Americans failed to end vodou, and rural Haitian life remained as imbued with it as ever before.

Haitian nationalists were further distraught following the 1937 genocide²³ of thousands of people of Black Haitian descent in the borderlands between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The genocide was committed by Dominican soldiers and police on the orders of President Rafael Trujillo, who was worried that a recent influx of large numbers of Haitian settlers would provide a pretext for the Haitian government to seize Dominican land.²⁴ The border between the two countries was settled in 1936,²⁵ but was a line on a map rather than a meaningful boundary as understood by the people of the borderlands.²⁶ Upwards of one hundred thousand²⁷ Haitians had settled in the Haitian-Dominican borderlands by October 1937, when Trujillo's order was issued and tens of thousands²⁸ of ethnic Haitians were murdered over the course of just a few days. It was the

19 Johnson, "Secretism and the Apotheosis of Duvalier," 426.

20 Ibid., 427.

21 Abbott, Haiti, 41.

22 Johnson, "Secretism and the Apotheosis of Duvalier," 427.

23 Richard Lee Turits sometimes uses the term "genocide" to describe the events of 1937 though most scholars use the term "massacre". The United Nations Convention on the Prevention of Genocide defines "genocide" as violence "committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group". It is evident that this occurred in the Haitian-Dominican borderlands in 1937.

24 Abbott, Haiti, 49.

25 Richard Lee Turits, "A World Destroyed, a Nation Imposed: The 1937 Haitian Massacre in the Dominican Republic," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 82, no. 3 (August 2002): 610.

26 Michele Wucker, *Why the Cocks Fight: Dominicans, Haitians, and the Struggle for Hispaniola*, 46-47.

27 Abbott, Haiti, 49.

28 Abbot gives a figure of 30 000 killed in the Dominican Vespers on page 49 of Haiti; Brian Weinstein and Aaron Segal state a figure of "up to 20 000 persons" on page 36 of Haiti: The Failure of Politics; Wucker puts the toll at "at least 15 000" on page 50 of *Why the Cocks Fight*. The true number killed in the genocide will never be known, but it can be said with certainty that it is in the tens of thousands.

worst single act of violence in Haitian history.²⁹

The Haitian government's reaction to the genocide was "oddly muted."³⁰ President Sténio Vincent, a mulatto, at first tried to suppress evidence of the genocide,³¹ then when news broke, insisted on taking the matter to international arbitration rather than pursuing a more forceful response.³² Vincent's actions following the genocide led Black Haitian nationalists to perceive the mulatto President as anti-Black³³, and many believed that Vincent pocketed the bulk of the meagre indemnity payment that Trujillo had agreed to pay³⁴. Though Haiti's mulatto elite class largely agreed with Vincent,³⁵ Black Haitian nationalists felt otherwise. To them, the genocide had been further proof that Haiti's mulattoes were uninterested in protecting even the basic interests of Black Haitians.

Amidst the American occupation, Black Haitians intellectuals increasingly looked toward Haiti's African heritage as a source of authentic national identity. The ethnological movement emerged in the 1920s from the Black middle class³⁶ following the defeat of the "caco" rebellion of Black peasants³⁷ led by Charlemagne Peralte against the Americans. Ethnologists saw the culture of Black rural Haitians as authentically Haitian, implicitly and explicitly defining the culture of the "mulatto" elite as alien.³⁸ One of the originators of the movement was sociologist Jean Price-Mars, whose landmark 1928 work *Ainsi Parla l'Oncle* challenged readers to understand the heretofore denigrated traditions of Black rural Haitians.³⁹ The ethnology movement was hugely influential for Black Haitian nationalists, laying the groundwork for their entry into politics in the 1940s.⁴⁰

The political dimensions of the ethnological movement were termed *noirisme*. *Noiristes* linked the Haitian Revolution and the birth of the Haitian nation with the practice of *vodou*,⁴¹ as the Revolution

29 Abbott, Haiti, 49.

30 Wucker, *Why the Cocks Fight*, 54.

31 Abbott, Haiti, 50.

32 Turits, "A World Destroyed, a Nation Imposed," 622-3.

33 Weinstein and Segal, Haiti, 36.

34 Ibid.

35 Abbott, Haiti, 50.

36 Anselme Remy, "The Duvalier Phenomenon," *Caribbean Studies* 14, no. 4 (July 1974): 41

37 Castor and Garafola, "The American Occupation of Haiti (1915-34) and the Dominican Republic (1916-24)," 269.

38 Abbot, Haiti, 42.

39 Nicholls, "Politics and Religion in Haiti," 401.

40 Remy, "The Duvalier Phenomenon," 45.

41 Johnson, "Secretism and the Apotheosis of Duvalier," 423.

had famously been inaugurated by a vodou ceremony at Bois Caïman.⁴² Noiristes believed there to be a biological basis for race,⁴³ and on that premise believed the African-descended people of Haiti had particular, inalterable characteristics that shaped their behavior.⁴⁴ Following from this, noiristes argued that the European-derived model of governance and social structure upheld by Haiti's mulatto elite was ill-suited to Haiti's Black majority.⁴⁵ Noiristes held that it was for this reason that Haiti became weak, leading to the twin humiliations of occupation by Americans and genocide by Dominicans.⁴⁶ Noirisme connected older criticisms of the concentration of wealth and power by Haiti's mulattoes to these new arguments centred on racial incompatibility.

François Duvalier first emerged as a major figure in Haitian politics through his involvement in noirisme. Duvalier was first exposed to the ethnological movement as a teenager by Jean Price-Mars, who was one of his high school teachers.⁴⁷ At the medical school he attended in his early twenties, Duvalier connected with like-minded individuals who came to call themselves griots, an African-derived term for storytellers and magicians,⁴⁸ and he would later publish a weekly literary journal by that name.⁴⁹ The seeds of Duvalier's political program as President can be seen in some of the ideas espoused by the writers of *Les Griots*. Duvalier's clique attacked liberalism and democracy as tools with which the mulatto elite had manipulated the state for their own benefit,⁵⁰ linking mulattoes to Haiti's underdevelopment.⁵¹ Their proposed solution was a replacement of the current organization of government with a patriarchal⁵² Black dictatorship, a concept premised on their noiriste assumptions of innate Black difference.⁵³ Duvalier primarily wrote about vodou and the inspiration it had provided to Black Haitians during the Haitian Revolution and other periods.⁵⁴ As Haiti entered the 1940s, Duvalier had become convinced that only the ideology of the griots and a reorientation of Haitian life toward noirisme could save the nation.

42 Gingras, Duvalier, *Caribbean Cyclone*, 19.

43 Nicholls, "Ideology and Political Protest in Haiti, 1930-46," 6.

44 Weinstein and Segal, *Haiti*, 35.

45 Munro, "Can't Stand up for Falling down," 6.

46 Johnson, "Secretism and the Apotheosis of Duvalier," 428.

47 *Ibid.*, 438.

48 Abbott, *Haiti*, 48.

49 Johnson, "Secretism and the Apotheosis of Duvalier," 428.

50 Nicholls, "Ideology and Political Protest in Haiti, 1930-46," 7.

51 Matthew J. Smith, "VIVE 1804!: The Haitian Revolution and the Revolutionary Generation of 1946," *Caribbean Quarterly* 50, no. 4 (December 2004): 32.

52 Weinstein and Segal, *Haiti*, 35.

53 Nicholls, "Ideology and Political Protest in Haiti, 1930-46," 7.

54 Abbott, *Haiti*, 54.

The policies of President Élie Lescot, in office from 1940 to 1946, further antagonized Black Haitian nationalists while Duvalier's personal stature rose. Lescot, who was supported by Rafael Trujillo and the American embassy,⁵⁵ made the grandiose decision to declare war on the Axis powers following Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, though his country was poor and ill-equipped to fight in an industrial war. His true intentions were to win support from the United States⁵⁶ and provide pretext for the declaration of a state of emergency, allowing him to suppress dissidents such as the griots.⁵⁷ Despite formally being at war with the Axis powers, Lescot worked in concert with the Vichy France-aligned⁵⁸ French clergy of Haiti's Catholic Church to initiate an insistent anti-vodou campaign. Priests were instructed to force Black Catholics to renounce the practice of vodou and to physically destroy the objects of the vodou faith.⁵⁹ The campaign aroused a bitter reaction among Black Haitians and made Lescot extremely unpopular.⁶⁰ Meanwhile, François Duvalier was selected by an American organization to run a clinic devoted to the treatment of yaws, a debilitating yet highly treatable condition that affected thousands of rural Haitians.⁶¹ Between 1943 and 1946 Duvalier cured thousands of patients, eventually traveling the country with mobile clinics to save lives. Through this work, he gained the nickname "Papa Doc" and became a national figure.⁶² As the elite Lescot regime crumbled under the weight of popular protest, Duvalier grew to prominence in rural Haiti.

The presidency of Lescot's successor, Dumarsais Estimé, further established Duvalier as a national figure while implementing some aspects of the noiriste program. Estimé, the first Black leader of Haiti since the American invasion and another former student of Jean Price-Mars⁶³ came to power after striking students, many of them noiristes,⁶⁴ prompted the ouster of Lescot by the military. Estimé, a moderate noiriste,⁶⁵ instituted popular reforms, such as protections for unions, school construction, tourism development, and increases in salaries for working Haitians.⁶⁶ Furthermore, he promoted a large number of Black Haitians in the civil service and appointed others to his cabinet, advancing the Black middle

55 Ibid., 52.

56 Weinstein and Segal, *Haiti*, 36.

57 Gingras, *Duvalier, Caribbean Cyclone*, 77.

58 Nicholls, "Politics and Religion in Haiti," 405.

59 Nicholls, "Ideology and Political Protest in Haiti, 1930-46," 12.

60 Abbott, *Haiti*, 54.

61 Ibid., 55.

62 Ibid.

63 Weinstein and Segal, *Haiti*, 36.

64 Smith, Matthew J. "VIVE 1804!," 26.

65 Abbott, *Haiti*, 56.

66 Gingras, *Duvalier, Caribbean Cyclone*, 82.

class.⁶⁷ One of the appointees was François Duvalier, Estimé's Public Health and Labor Minister. To Duvalier, Estimé was a heroic, inspiring figure who worked to empower the Black majority.⁶⁸ With his griot friend Lorimer Denis, Duvalier published his first political treatise entitled *Problèmes des classes à travers l'histoire d'Haïti* in 1948. The treatise argued that all great leaders of Haiti had been black⁶⁹ and held that the 1946 protests that had brought Estimé to power was the first strike against mulatto hegemony in generations⁷⁰. Duvalier's cabinet office and treatise reflected a new level of engagement in Haitian politics, and foreshadowed his later rule.

After trying to extend his term beyond its constitutional limits, Estimé was overthrown in 1950 by the military that had helped to bring him to power just four years previously. Though the fall of Estimé was a disappointment for the noiristes, the events of 1950–57 ultimately allowed Duvalier to win the support of the electorate in 1957. With the backing of the United States⁷¹ and the “mulatto” elite⁷² Estimé was replaced by Colonel Paul Magloire, a Black Haitian who was nonetheless perceived by Haitians to be primarily responsive to the interests of those who helped him into power.⁷³ Magloire ended the populist policies of his predecessor, and most of the income from a tourism boom went to the urban elite.⁷⁴ When economic crisis hit in the mid-1950s, Magloire's extravagant spending and blatant corruption⁷⁵ made him deeply unpopular, a perception that was exacerbated by rumors that he wanted to extend his term at the end of 1956.⁷⁶ Magloire's regime had widened the gulf between the prosperity of the mulatto elite and the Black majority, arousing desires among Black Haitians for a return to the policies of Estimé.

During the long, bloody election campaign of 1957, the conditions were set for Duvalier's successful candidacy. Events of the previous decades—occupation by the Americans, genocide by the Dominicans, persecution of vodou adherents, corruption and exploitation by “mulatto” governments—had lent credence to noiriste arguments regarding the need for Black Haitians to control the government. Poor Haitians wanted

67 Weinstein and Segal, *Haiti*, 37.

68 Abbott, *Haiti*, 57.

69 Weinstein and Segal, *Haiti*, 39.

70 Abbott, *Haiti*, 57.

71 Johnson, “Secretism and the Apotheosis of Duvalier,” 429.

72 Gingras, Duvalier, *Caribbean Cyclone*, 87.

73 Weinstein and Segal, *Haiti*, 37.

74 Abbott, *Haiti*, 59.

75 Mats Lundahl states that Magloire embezzled US\$12-28 million from the state in “History as an Obstacle to Change: The Case of Haiti,” *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 31, no. 1/2 (Spring–Summer 1989), 9.

76 Weinstein and Segal, *Haiti*, 38.

a return to the time of Estimé, when modest progress had been made in the field of Black empowerment. As a presidential candidate, Duvalier strategically positioned himself to take advantage of these realities. Already popular after having cured thousands of Haitians across the country of yaws, Duvalier was endorsed by large numbers of vodou houngans,⁷⁷ or ritual leaders, and went on to portray himself as the legitimate successor to his hero, Dumarsais Estimé.⁷⁸ Daniel Fignolé, another Black noiriste and Duvalier's only serious opponent, was co-opted by the military into a weak provisional government. When that provisional government collapsed, the military disqualified Fignolé from the election.⁷⁹ This left Louis Déjoie, a wealthy businessman and the choice of the Catholic church, American embassy, and "mulatto" elite,⁸⁰ as Duvalier's main challenger. In years past, Déjoie's coalition would have allowed him to sail to victory, but in 1957, he received just over a third of the winner's votes.

François Duvalier's victory was the result of a number of complex factors. His work against yaws had granted him personal popularity, and the fall of Fignolé certainly made his election more probable, but above all else, the victory was a repudiation of the elitist manner of rule pursued by Magloire and embodied by Déjoie. To Haiti's Black majority, these figures connoted American and Dominican intervention, the suppression of vodou, and economic exploitation. Noirisme provided an intellectual basis on which Black Haitian nationalists and the rural majority who supported them could reject the old model in pursuit of a new one. Tragically, Duvalier's reputation as a transformational figure was not won because he delivered Haiti from the problems of its past, but because he virtually destroyed civil society and subjected his country to unprecedented violence.

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77 Nicholls, "Politics and Religion in Haiti," 407.

78 Abbott, *Haiti*, 64.

79 *Ibid.*, 66.

80 Nicholls, "The Rise and Fall of Duvalierism," 1239.

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THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT IN THE COLD WAR: BETWEEN POLICY AND RHETORIC

BY TEA HADŽIRISTIĆ

Much of the historiography about the Cold War focuses on the bilateral dynamics of the United States and the Soviet Union. And yet there were significant attempts by some states to escape this division into blocs and voice concerns about the threat the Cold War posed to peace, the most influential of which was the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Ultimately, the Non-Aligned Movement “comprised 55% of the world’s population, garnering more than 100 member countries, nearly two-thirds of whom were also members of the United Nations.”¹ The majority of these countries were from the Third World—the Global South, but the beginnings of non-alignment were found in the coordinated policies of Yugoslavia, Egypt, and India in the late 1950s. I would like to examine the extent to which NAM managed to steer an autonomous course in the international sphere—and to problematize conceptions of ideology as the main driving factor in the foreign policy of both NAM countries and the US/Soviet responses to them. Although the core belief of the NAM was that “avoiding bloc confrontations and preventing nuclear disaster were the sole principles of peaceful co-existence,”² I would like to show that it was more so a policy of pragmatism that drove the founding of the movement. Next, I would like to point out the various contradictions with which the great powers treated NAM, especially the tendency of the United States to lend financial support to states whose systems, according to rhetoric, they were committed to destroying. Lastly, I would like to try and assess the criticisms about the success and failures of NAM by their own logic.

In doing my research for this paper, I found major gaps in the historiography of the movement. For the most part, the books about the movement were written before the end of the Cold War, which in some instances distorted the perspective. Additionally, the books published in India tended to severely over-emphasize the role of both India and Jawaharlal Nehru in NAM, while the ones from the former Yugoslavia did the same, only with Tito. The Soviet books provided an overly sympathetic view of the movement, which is not necessarily in line with actual policy, whereas American historians seem to have mostly ignored the movement.

1 Nada Torlak et al, “Tito, Yugoslavia, and the Third Way: Understanding Physical and Symbolic Borders,” *Eurolimes* 11 (2011), 55.

2 *Ibid.*, 55.

Thus I found that a useful entry point into the movement was the relations between Yugoslavia and the United States and Soviet Union.

In Yugoslavia after World War Two, the Yugoslav Partisans, led by Josip Broz Tito, had defeated the fascist occupiers without external help, and this legacy ensured Yugoslavia's independence after the war. The limited involvement of the Red Army in helping liberate some territory late into the war was brought about by an agreement which stressed the temporariness of this involvement, and the Soviet Union accordingly withdrew by the end of the conflict. This settlement could be interpreted as a sign that the USSR saw Yugoslavia as an equal state even immediately after the war. Thus Tito's 'third way' was a natural extension of the way WWII had been won. Additionally, the USSR had not been as generous, in terms of economic aid, as Yugoslavia expected, especially in comparison to the almost 400 million US dollars in food aid through the UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) that they received.³ Despite receiving aid from the West, Yugoslavia was diplomatically 'difficult' in the postwar period, as in the territorial dispute with Italy over Trieste. In the case of the Greek civil war, Yugoslavia went against the inclinations of both the US and USSR in supporting the Greek communists. This involvement "was condemned by the UN General Assembly in 1947" and the USSR failed to support Yugoslavia diplomatically, because it did not wish to expand Yugoslav influence in the Balkans.⁴ In 1948, the Tito/Stalin split led to the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform. Stalin "called for Yugoslav communists to disavow their leader because he was displeased by Tito's attempts to break from the Soviet bloc,"⁵ and his attempts to have an independent foreign policy. This left Yugoslavia isolated, but the West was quick to embrace its departure from the Soviet bloc.

The 1948 Tito/Stalin split was important in shaping both American and Soviet policies vis-à-vis states that fell between the cracks of the Cold War. The 1948 split marked the first fissure in the communist 'monolith' and the U.S.'s policy towards it set an important precedent for future dealings with 'renegade' socialist states. George Kennan perceived the development as profoundly significant new factor in international politics, which would ensure that "the possibility of defection would now be on the minds of other communist leaders."⁶ The problem for the United States

3 Nebojsa Bjelakovic, "Comrades and adversaries: Yugoslav-Soviet conflict in 1948--a reappraisal," *East European Quarterly* 33/1(Spring 1999), 102.

4 Ibid., 105.

5 Torlak "Tito, Yugoslavia, and the Third Way," 54.

6 Lorraine Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania

was “how to fashion a policy toward ‘a communist state resting on the basis of Soviet organization principles and for the most part Soviet ideology, and yet independent of Moscow.’”⁷ Though there was disagreement within the US administration, the general consensus was that Tito’s Yugoslavia was “the sole instrument available to the West ‘for undermining Soviet influence in Eastern Europe.’”⁸ Thus the initial American response—which was to offer economics aid and covert support of Tito—was very much in line with Truman’s doctrine of containment. Overtly, the U.S. could be seen to support the independence of small nations who broke from ‘Soviet imperialism’ and did not demand policy changes from Yugoslavia in exchange for aid. The more surreptitious intent can be seen through the CIA’s view that through the economic deterioration of Yugoslavia and its increasing dependence on the West, Tito might be forced to change his foreign policy.⁹

Tito’s foreign policy post-1948 was very much a pragmatic response to the situation at hand—deprived of Soviet aid (and facing a Cominform blockade) and in need to funds to rebuild the postwar state, Yugoslavia depended on American financial aid, and thus had to approach the West. These stronger relations resulted in Yugoslavia entering a military alliance with Greece and Turkey—the Balkan Treaty—in 1953.¹⁰ Despite this, Yugoslavia was never convinced to join NATO—its independence from any major military pact (NATO/The Warsaw Pact) was certainly a factor in its ‘third way’ policy. In some ways, it is fair to be skeptical of the claim that Yugoslavia always led a non-aligned policy, as it is clear that in the years before the NAM, it veered from close relations to the USSR to close relations with the West.

Though Tito was a major founder of the Non-Aligned Movement, he cannot necessarily be credited with the concept itself. Non-alignment as a concept is variously attributed to Nehru or Nasser. One source states that it was Nasser who, before the Bandung Conference, “began to formulate in public statements a number of ideas which he later called neutralism or nonalignment,”¹¹ especially because he felt that small states ought not be aligned with great powers. By that time he had resisted American attempts to get Egypt to join CENTO, and negotiated an arms deal with State University Press, 1997), 54.

7 Ibid., 53.

8 Ibid., 63.

9 Ibid., 65.

10 Bjelakovic, “Comrades and Adversaries,” 107.

11 Don Peretz, “Nonalignment in the Arab World,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 362/1 (January 1965), 39.

Czechoslovakia, through the Soviet Union. Thus it seems that nonalignment arose in Egypt almost naturally, in a similar way that it did in Yugoslavia, as a pragmatic response to the realities of being a small state. Nasser intuited that neither the US nor the Soviet Union would allow such a strategically important country to fall into the other's hands, and thus Egypt would benefit from competition over it—and escape being dependent on either.¹²

India under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had, since its independence in 1947, refused to succumb to great power politics. Nehru is also said to have coined the term 'nonalignment' (as is one of his foreign ministers) in references to the concept in 1950s, and non-alignment as a foreign policy seems to be 'read into' all of India's pre-1961 policies. Yet the foreign policy of Nehru sounded far more pragmatic and even aggressive than mere neutrality; non-alignment was second to national self-interest. In December 1947, Nehru stated that India's proclamation that it would not ally itself with any group had "nothing to do with neutrality... We are not going to join a war if we can help it: and we are going to join the side which it is to our interest when the time comes to make the choice."¹³ I think a good argument could be made that India's foreign policy did not necessarily deviate from this stance—joining the Non-Aligned Movement was as much in their interest as receiving American military aid during the border conflict with China. The underlying realism of Nehru's position does, however, imply that non-alignment was only a code word for 'acting in one's interest.'

Thus the origins of nonalignment in general or as a coherent movement are not easily pinned down. I argue that because the movement mainly arose out of pragmatism, it was "only after non-alignment had been developed as a coherent ideology," that all three of the founding states sought to "reinterpret the past to claim that they had always been Non-Aligned."¹⁴ Fittingly, all of the founding states seem to have fostered hagiographic versions of how their own leaders coined the term, defined it, or led the movement.

Much of this retelling of NAM pins down the 1955 Bandung Conference as a natural processor to the movement. These, claims Peter Willets, are in fact 'false roots.' The Conference was significant because it involved many newly decolonized Third World states taking part in a meeting together for the first time without European powers present. But the states that met at Bandung endorsed military pacts, and, in the Ten

12 Peretz, "Nonalignment in the Arab World," 40.

13 Peter Willets, *The Non-Aligned Movement: Origins of a Third World Alliance* (London: Frances Pinter Ltd), 1978), 6.

14 Ibid., 2.

Principles they produced, omitted “peaceful coexistence” as a state goal.¹⁵ The ideas that would be agreed upon at the Belgrade Conference six years later were not yet evident.

The first actual conference in which non-alignment arose as policy was on the 18th and 19th of July 1956 on the Brioni Islands off the Adriatic Coast. Tito, Nehru, and Nasser signed a joint declaration which would become the foundation for the Non-Aligned Movement. The focus was mostly on issues of peace—concerns about disarmament and nuclear proliferation, and to allow states to escape the binary world of “two antagonistic camps.”¹⁶ It is interesting that in this initial collaboration between Tito, Nehru, and Nasser, ‘peace’ was a more important goal than national liberation movements, which would dominate the movement in the 70s. This could be attributed to the dual events of 1956—the Hungarian Revolution and the Suez Crisis, which threatened the security of the founding states and demonstrated the dangers of the Cold War in general. In September 1960, Tito, Nasser, Nehru, Nkrumah (of Ghana), and Indonesia’s Sukarno met to discuss the increase in Cold War tensions. The five agreed to sponsor a UN “resolution calling for the American President and the Soviet Chairman ‘to renew their contacts interrupted recently’.”¹⁷ This call for rapprochement was rejected by both sides, but this meeting was afterward referred to by non-aligned countries as the Movement’s first meeting.

In Belgrade in 1961, the first conference of the Non-Aligned Movement was attended by 25 delegates of member-states. This was the first time that non-alignment as a coherent set of ideas was set out. The main (original) tenets of the Movement were defined at this conference:

- Freeing colonized and oppressed states and supporting liberation movements in these countries
- Adhering to the politics of détente, peace, and consensus-based resolutions to conflicts and questions
- Condemning policies of armament and the creation of nuclear weapons

15 Willets, *The Non-Aligned Movement*, 3.

16 Milivoj Dretar, “Položaj Jugoslavije u Pokretu nesvrstanih,” *Hrvatski Povijesni Portal*, 24 Aug 2010, <<http://povijest.net/sadrzaj/lenta/20-st/sfrj/951-polozaj-jugoslavije-u-pokretunesvrstanih.html>>.

17 Willets, *The Non-Aligned Movement*, 12.


- Condemning every kind of imperialism, colonialism, racism, and intervention in the internal affairs of other states¹⁸

As NAM grew, its increased membership also forced a shift in its mandate. The newly independent African countries which joined NAM “pressed issues of development and economics rather than political and ideological legitimacy.”¹⁹ The Havana Declaration of 1979 focused on national independence and essentially dropped issues of peace and coexistence—it was the last conference in which Yugoslavia played a significant role.

Peter Willets argues that most of the countries that joined NAM had, like its founders, very pragmatic reasons for doing so. This fascinating graph demonstrates his argument that it was certain situations which pushed states into deciding that NAM membership was the most advantageous for their country.

Figure 1: Peter Willets, *The Non-Aligned Movement: Origins of a Third World Alliance* (London: Frances Pinter Ltd, 1978), 226.

FIG. 6.1 ALLIANCE FORMATION IN THE THIRD WORLD



The fact that ideology was not as salient as the reasons which spurred nations into NAM is not necessarily a negative factor. Yet it too questions the commitment of these countries to non-alignment as opposed to a shrewd appraisal of how to best attain their national interest.

18 Dretar, “Položaj Jugoslavije u Pokretu nesvrstanih.”

19 Robert Niebuhr, “Nonalignment as Yugoslavia’s Answer to Bloc Politics,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 13/1 (Winter 2011), 168.

The perceptions of the movement by the two great powers were undoubtedly a key part in how NAM developed. Before the Movement, the Tito/Stalin break was the first opportunity for the United States to deal with an unaligned state, and arguably, this experience would shape its relations with such states from then on. The Truman administration considered Yugoslavia would be a useful “wedge” in promoting fissures within the communist world.²⁰ This ‘wedge strategy’ implied that the US would ‘keep Tito afloat’ in order to promote more cracks in the socialist bloc. The United States under President Truman supported Yugoslavia both economically and militarily after its break with the Soviet Union; one scholar deems this “willingness to extend secret and then open military assistance as well as economic aid to one communist country while waging war against another” as “remarkable.”²¹ Military support ended in 1958 due to Tito’s refusal to join NATO. The wedge policy itself challenged the bi-polarity of the early Cold War in that one of its essential tenets was that “mere adherence to communist ideology, absent allegiance to Soviet imperialism, did not render a state an unsuitable ally.”²² This divergence between rhetoric and policy is something that was a clear undercurrent during the Cold War, yet it would be inaccurate to state that ideology always took a back seat to pragmatism. Certainly, both played a role in the foreign policy of state actors.

Although the United States did not demand that Yugoslavia change its foreign or domestic policies in exchange for aid, there was a hope, as I said above, that increasing economic dependence on the West would persuade Tito to, over time, come to support the United States. And even in absence of a quid pro quo policy, Western could be said to have shaped some aspects of Yugoslavia’s foreign policy—for example, Yugoslavia ceased its support of the Greek Communists in the Greek Civil War,²³ something that was very much a US interest. Tito claimed that this cessation was because the Greeks supported the Cominform in expelling Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia also signed the Balkan Pact in 1955. (Yet the death of Stalin and the change of reconciliation with the Soviet Union pushed Yugoslavia once again between the two states, rather than leaning towards the West. He did not lose support of either.) In terms of domestic policy, the causal relationship between US aid and liberalization is unclear. While the

20 Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat*, xiii.

21 Ibid, xiv.

22 Ibid, xv.

23 Coleman Mehta, “The CIA Confronts the Tito-Stalin Split, 1948–1951,” *The Journal of Cold War Studies* 13/1 (Winter 2011), 124.

relationship between While Tito's break with Stalin led to the introduction of "many liberal elements into the culture that facilitated its development, including the openness of the country, a free regime for obtaining passports, rapid industrialization and urbanization, and raising social standards,"²⁴ he very much remained a Communist. The liberalization that occurs in the early 1950s was mostly an attempt at furthering the Yugoslav model of socialism from the Stalinist one. In this task Tito insisted that it was not deviationist—it actually followed Marxist Leninist teachings more closely—and that it was Stalinism that was deviationist.²⁵

During the Truman administration, the policy of containment meant that the US sought to openly confront communism everywhere it reared its head—and for a time this meant that non-alignment was seen simple as a 'Trojan Horse' of communism.²⁶ It is puzzling, however, that this rhetoric was not necessarily compatible with policies such as the sending of financial aid to Yugoslavia. The use of the 'wedge strategy' necessitated a relaxation of containment in order to more accurately interpret the nuances of states that, though socialist, did not support the USSR.

The Eisenhower administration pledged to "end the negative, sterile and immoral policy of 'containment,'"²⁷ but this did not result in a clear cut policy towards unaligned states. In the 1950s, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles endeavoured to enlarge the vast American system of military alliances—which included 42 countries at this point—and thus put pressure on countries "disinclined to join the alliances."²⁸ His stance on this differed somewhat from that of President Eisenhower—which the former seemed to avow the right of each nation of choose its own path, Dulles "condemned 'neutrality' as 'an obsolete conception and ... an immoral and short-sighted conception.'"²⁹ The rhetorical moral quest of Dulles ceased with the presidency of John F. Kennedy, who sent a message of goodwill to the 1961 Belgrade Conference "after considerable deliberations."³⁰

Yet the fundamental way that the US perceived NAM was through the lens of the Cold War—whenever the movement "failed to support US

24 Torlak, "Tito, Yugoslavia, and the Third Way," 61.

25 David L. Larson, *United States Foreign Policy Toward Yugoslavia, 1943-1963* (Washington D.C. University Press of American, 1979), 254.

26 Dretar, "Položaj Jugoslavije u Pokretu nesvrstanih."

27 Larson, *United States Foreign Policy*, 250.

28 B.K. Shrivastava, "The United States and the Non-Aligned Movement," *International Studies* 21/1-2 (1981), 433.

29 Ibid., 433.

30 Ibid., 434.

policies and positions, the United States...charged that the non-aligned were really not non-aligned but leaned heavily towards the Soviet Union.”³¹ I will return to this charge of being “not really non-aligned” when I discuss the critiques of the movement. For now, it is sufficient to note that the way in which the US perceived the movement varied according to whose policies NAM happened to lean towards at a given time. Eventually, the United States came to see the heterogeneity of NAM as a potential benefit; they saw the movement as composed to three different groups: the ‘extremists,’ which were Marxist or pro-Soviet states; the moderates truly committed to distance from both powers, like Yugoslavia and India; and the more conservative countries like Pakistan, Singapore, and Zaire, which were ‘friends of the US.’³²

The Soviet attitude regarding neutrality and non-alignment in general can be divided into several phases. Like the American attitude towards NAM, the Soviet Union’s policy “had cyclical ebbs and flows, [and] was marked by contradictory phenomena and processes.”³³ Both states tended to be selective in their treatment on nonaligned states, being more sympathetic those that more closely mimicked their own politico-economic frameworks.

The period between the end of WWII and the death of Stalin, or roughly 1948-1953, was dominated by a Stalinist view of ‘two antagonistic camps,’ which practically erased the space for nuance and neutrality. Thus, in this period, Soviet foreign policy overlooked the emergence of nonalignment as a veritable third force in international relations, and minimized the importance of “the maneuvering space opening up between the ‘two camps’ for their autonomous political action and for the policy of independence in general.”³⁴ The fact that Yugoslav non-alignment had emerged in opposition to, and at the expense of the Soviet Union added to the disparagement of the idea. Zhdanov’s critique of neutrality was likely the ideological counterpart of Dulles’ comments about its immorality.

After Stalin’s death, the vitriolic attacks on ‘Titoism’ calmed, and Khrushchev even visited Yugoslavia in 1955. Khrushchev’s policy of de-Stalinization and a return to Leninist principles of peaceful co-existence lent a more welcoming atmosphere to the non-aligned movement. He recognized “the significant of the decision by a large number of states to

31 Shrivastava, “The United States and the Non-Aligned Movement,” 436.

32 Ibid., 441.

33 Ranko Petkovic, *Non-alignment and the big powers* (Belgrade: Jugoslovenska Svarnost, 1979), 25.

34 Ibid, 24.

reject military-political integration in Western-sponsored military alliances” and these non-bloc states were categorized as “positive neutrals.”³⁵ Yet this was not the entire story; apparently Khrushchev “deplored the ‘prattle about a ‘nonbloc’ policy’ as a deliberate method to fool ‘people and obtain their approval’ and criticized Tito’s ignorance of the socialist camp and his concurrent boost of the Yugoslav ‘policy of neutrality.’”³⁶

The phase of détente in the 1970s marked a larger great power interest in newly decolonized states, and more favourable relations of the USSR and US with NAM. Yet most scholars argue that NAM was rendered irrelevant as a third-party mediator once “the two sides started direct negotiations on subjects of mutual interest”³⁷ during détente. Its changing agenda, outlined above, helped keep NAM relevant, but its attempts, like the one after the Belgrade Conference, to establish links between the superpowers were now unnecessary.

It is significant that, like the United States toward Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union hoped, or rather anticipated that “the neutralist course would contribute ‘to the transition of a national state on socialist lines’.”³⁸ Like the Americans, the Soviet Union saw potential benefits from the very heterogeneity of the countries of NAM and especially the increase of this polarization in the late 1980s, as countries that were more moderate, such as Yugoslavia, lost influence in the movement. The USSR did not believe that the countries of NAM—which increasingly represented the Third World—created a ‘third centre’ between the two poles in world politics. Rather, the more common view was that of “a long term tendency of ‘erosion’” in which “certain states join the world socialist system while others, which are more advance on the ‘capitalist path’, draw closer to the group of developed Western countries.”³⁹

The Cold War was exemplary in the degree to which rhetoric differed from reality, and as we have seen, the Great Power attitudes towards non-aligned states often contradicted public statements or overarching ideologies. Lorraine Lees questions “what most reflected each administration’s sentiments—the assistance given to Tito’s communist state or the words...positing the defeat of the ideology to which that regime

35 Allison, *The Soviet Union and the strategy of non-alignment in the Third World*, 21.

36 Robert Niebuhr, “Nonalignment as Yugoslavia’s Answer to Bloc Politics,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 13/1 (Winter 2011), 174.

37 Shrivastava, “The United States and the Non-Aligned Movement,” 442.

38 Allison, *The Soviet Union*, 23.

39 Ibid., 55.

adhered?²⁴⁰ An additional question I would add is to what degree the independence of non-aligned policy could be removed from financial [inter] dependence? That is, did the amount of aid received from either the US or the USSR undermine the autonomy of NAM?

TABLE 6.6
WESTERN AID PER COUNTRY, p.a., AS A PROPORTION OF G.N.P.
Averages not weighted by the size of the G.N.P.

	1960–61*	1963–64	1969–70
Spain, Greece, Turkey	(1.5%)	1.2%	0.9%
Western Bloc Asians	(2.6%)	2.5%	1.4%
Latin Americans	(1.5%)	1.9%	1.2%
Non-Bloc Afro-Asians	(7.2%)	4.5%	3.3%
Non-Aligned	(2.7%)	5.3%	3.4%
All recipients	(3.6%)	4.1%	2.8%

Figure 2: Peter Willets, *The Non-Aligned Movement: Origins of a Third World Alliance* (London: Frances Pinter Ltd, 1978), 214.

The table above demonstrates the very large proportion of Western aid that went to the non-aligned countries.

TABLE 4.5
THE CHANGING DIPLOMATIC ALIGNMENT OF THE NON-ALIGNED

	Index Value 1964		Index Value 1970		
	Belgrade Attendees	Cairo Attendees	Belgrade Attendees	Cairo Attendees	Lusaka Attendees
High West	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%
Mod. West	15%	34%	27%	39%	43%
Non-Aligned	69%	55%	31%	30%	30%
Mod. East	11%	7%	19%	17%	15%
High East	4%	2%	23%	13%	11%
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	=26	=44*	=26	=46	=53

Figure 3: Peter Willets, *The Non-Aligned Movement: Origins of a Third World Alliance* (London: Frances Pinter Ltd, 1978), 126.

Table 4.5 demonstrates the changing diplomatic alignment of the NAM members—it does not suggest that a shift to the West occurred due to a large amount of aid. It does, however, point out that by 1970, the movement had dispersed, with a majority of states diplomatically leaning

towards East or West, and a smaller percentage still entirely un-aligned. Thus I think that there is insufficient evidence to claim that financial aid necessarily curtailed autonomy.

It is difficult to judge the degrees of success and failure that the Movement achieved because its aims were often so thoroughly subsumed by Cold War politics. The main criticisms of the movement are that non-alignment was ill-defined as a concept, and that its main dynamic was cynically setting one side against another to reap the most rewards. That is, the main critiques are of the noncompliance to a 'strict ideology' by NAM members. It is likely true that most non-aligned states followed "a policy of playing one side off against the other to extract the maximum gain possible for itself,"⁴¹ but this was not necessarily acting contrary to the principles of non-alignment. Nehru's policy, for example, was always about national interest and "finding out what is most advantageous to the country."⁴² Thus, when China threatened India's north border in 1962, Nehru's reliance on American military assistance, which Abadi regards as a damning example of the emptiness of non-alignment, could instead be seen as the kind of response that non-alignment stood for—an individual one.

The other key criticism of NAM was its inability to effectively create a bloc of like-minded leaders. The preceding graphs show the change—from 1961 to 1970—of the diplomatic leanings and military alliances of its members, and the general diffusion of policy. On the other, hand not creating a third power bloc was one of the aims of the movement, and it was only "due to ideological pressure coming from the bloc leaders and the need to develop a coherent and distinct reply that non-alignment could not remain a policy but itself had to develop an ideology."⁴³ Thus the most important aspect of non-alignment was that there would be no a prior loyalty given to one side over another—that each issue would be taken "on its own merits." It is interesting that this attempt to escape from narrow 'with us or against us' logic was caused by that very logic to develop a more coherent ideology. To return to the example of US aid to India, the acceptance of that military aid could hardly be considered a decision to unquestioningly support US policy. Was there a true difference between being equidistant from the US and USSR versus being equally close to both?

Non-alignment was never a policy of neutrality, in its traditional

41 Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat*, 169.

42 Jacob Abadi, "The Sino-Indian conflict of 1962--a test case for India's policy on non-alignment.," *Journal of Third World Studies* 15/2(Fall 1998), 12.

43 Willets, *The Non-Aligned Movement: Origins of a Third World Alliance*, 20.

sense, nor was it involved or uninterested in conflicts. It did not even necessarily preclude all military alliances—only those that were overtly tied to Great Power politics, such as NATO or its offshoots CENTO and SEATO. Eisenhower observed that “Tito’s policy of ‘active coexistence’ allowed his country to ‘play a role on the world stage out of proportion to Yugoslavia’s size and strength...[its] brand of neutralism was ‘an attempt to exert influence in international affairs by enhancing the nation’s bargaining position...’”⁴⁴ The ‘disproportionate’ role of all of the NAM states could be seen in the high regard, or at least attention, they were awarded by the great powers; both the US and Soviet Union devoted “major diplomatic efforts and extensive economic support”⁴⁵ to the foreign policies of especially Egypt and Yugoslavia. The institutionalization of the non-aligned movement extended the opportunity for neutral states to combine their political strength and thus increase the significance of their views. The international prestige granted the leaders of NAM countries also increased their domestic legitimacy; prestige could even serve as a compensation for security.

Lees says of Tito that “his resolve to remain both a communist and a neutral proved stronger than either sides’ attempts to control him” while “the Truman and Eisenhower administrations...[revealed] a willingness to forgo ideological conformity to gain a substantial political advantage.”⁴⁶ So despite NAM’s failures or obsolescence in addressing Cold War tensions, I think that it did offer a breathing space in which states could maintain some degree of domestic and foreign autonomy. Non-alignment as an ideology focuses on the role of states in the international system. Peter Willet argues that, like most ideologies, its origins are in I) identification—the need for new states for self-identification, and a ‘counterideology’ to Cold War divisions, II) stress, and III) the means of articulating of national interest.⁴⁷ The first the NAM evidently offered, and the changing rhetoric of the movement corresponds to the changing self-identification of its membership. The ‘stress’ that caused most states to join the movement is a key point, because it was realistic stances that underscored the ambitious aims of NAM. The third point is also important, because it emphasizes that the roots of any ideology are in national interest. Non-alignment, in some ways, served as a method of both articulating and legitimizing this interest, and within the context of a broader movement, the interests of

44 Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat* , 164.

45 Peretz, “Nonalignment in the Arab World,” 43.

46 Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat*, 235.

47 Willets, *The Non-Aligned Movement: Origins of a Third World Alliance*, 29.

small states could be taken more seriously. Thus the irony about Tito being more consistent in his policy than the United States administrations which abandoned rigid ideology for political gain adds to the sense that, for a period between non-alignment's unofficial beginnings in the 50s and the changing of its mandate in the 70s, the movement was successful at least on its own terms.

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